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WELFARE STANDARDS IN U.S. AND E.U.
ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT
Roger D. Blair* & D. Daniel Sokol**
The potential goals of antitrust are numerous. Goals matter to antitrust.
We believe that it is total welfare rather than consumer welfare that should
drive antitrust analysis. We use this Article as an opportunity to explore
both a comparative analysis of welfare standards across E.U. and U.S.
competition systems and the impact of welfare standards on global antitrust
systemwide welfare.
In this Article, we analyze two types of situations in which there would be
a different outcome based on the goal implemented. One scenario involves
resale price maintenance (RPM). For RPM, we argue that even if there
were a different welfare standard across jurisdictions as between Europe
and the United States, in practice, it would have very little global impact.
The second scenario involves merger control. We analyze a divergence in
welfare standards between merger regimes where the use of efficiencies
might play out differently across Europe and the United States depending
on the welfare standard used. Under this second scenario, the welfare
standard matters globally as to business outcomes in a way in which it does
not under the first scenario. If one major merger regime blocks the merger,
it effectively blocks the merger globally. Finally, we provide our concluding
thoughts on the future and desirability of convergence around total welfare
as the sole goal in the practice of competition economics globally.
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INTRODUCTION
Goals matter to antitrust.1 While proponents of antitrust (in the United
States) and competition law (most of the rest of the world) may have had
multiple goals when initially enacting legislation,2 two goals predominate
modern academic and policy discourse: total welfare (the overall surplus
from producers and consumers) and consumer welfare (the surplus only
from consumers).3 Much of the time these goals are indistinguishable in
practice, because behavior that violates antitrust law often reduces both
consumer and total welfare. However, there are certain situations in which
the behavior in question violates only one of these goals. In those
situations, the goal selected matters to the execution of antitrust law,
particularly when there are not per se legal rules regarding legality or
illegality.4

1. ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 50
(1978). Ambiguity about the goals (a distinction between rules and standards) or
inconsistency among goals may be costly. Indeed, divergence among standards across
countries is costly, and we believe that total surplus is the superior standard.
2. See INT’L COMPETITION NETWORK, ADVOCACY AND COMPETITION POLICY REPORT
(2002), available at http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/uploads/library/doc
358.pdf (“[O]bjectives of competition laws vary widely from one jurisdiction to another . . . .
[P]arallel objectives, possibly conflicting with that of economic efficiency or consumer
welfare, are present in many competition laws.”).
3. We note that there is a difference between welfare and surplus, but we use the term
“welfare” as shorthand throughout this Article because the debate has been framed as
between consumer welfare and total welfare. For a discussion of the difference between
welfare and surplus, see Barak Y. Orbach, The Antitrust Consumer Welfare Paradox,
7 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 133 (2010).
4. See Roger D. Blair & D. Daniel Sokol, The Rule of Reason and the Goals of
Antitrust: An Economic Approach, 78 ANTITRUST L.J. 471, 498–502 (2012) (providing
examples of joint ventures, mergers, bilateral monopolies, physician cooperative bargaining,
all-or-none offers, two part pricing, and bid rigging in English auctions, in which a different
welfare standard may lead to divergent outcomes for the same type of behavior).
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As we have argued elsewhere,5 we believe that it is total welfare rather
than consumer welfare that should drive antitrust analysis. This is not a
new position within antitrust scholarship. Indeed, it seems to be the
dominant one.6 Under a total welfare standard, any behavior that reduces
total welfare would be deemed unlawful, whereas any behavior that does
not would be lawful.
As part of the total welfare analysis, we utilize the Kaldor-Hicks
compensation principle to assess the impact that various practices would
have on total welfare.7 The strength of Kaldor-Hicks is its ability to
provide an economically sound methodology for separating objectionable
and unobjectionable business behavior. For example, a merger may be
Kaldor-Hicks efficient if the winner (the monopolist) is able to compensate
the loser (consumers) and still have profits left over.8
Welfare standards within antitrust have been studied in great depth
within a single jurisdictional setting.9 Most of the time, the battle over
welfare standards has been overblown, and there is no difference in
outcome. We use this Article as an opportunity to explore both a
5. See generally id.
6. See, e.g., BORK, supra note 1, at 50; MASSIMO MOTTA, COMPETITION POLICY:
THEORY AND PRACTICE (2004); RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW ix (2d ed. 2001);
Dennis W. Carlton, Does Antitrust Need To Be Modernized?, 21 J. ECON. PERSP. 155 (2007);
Kenneth G. Elzinga, The Goals of Antitrust: Other Than Competition and Efficiency, What
Else Counts?, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 1191 (1977); Joseph Farrell & Michael L. Katz, The
Economics of Welfare Standards in Antitrust, 2 COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L 3 (2006); Ken
Heyer, Welfare Standards and Merger Analysis: Why Not the Best?, 2 COMPETITION POL’Y
INT’L 29 (2006); Alan J. Meese, Debunking the Purchaser Welfare Account of Section 2 of
the Sherman Act: How Harvard Brought Us a Total Welfare Standard and Why We Should
Keep It, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 659 (2010).
7. See RICHARD E. JUST ET AL., THE WELFARE ECONOMICS OF PUBLIC POLICY: A
PRACTICAL APPROVAL TO PROJECT AND POLICY EVALUATION 32–38 (2004) (discussing the
Kaldor-Hicks compensation principle); see also J.R. Hicks, The Foundations of Welfare
Economics, 49 ECON. J. 696 (1939); Nicholas Kaldor, Welfare Propositions in Economic and
Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility, 49 ECON. J. 549 (1939).
8. See Blair & Sokol, supra note 4, at 483–89.
9. Jonathan B. Baker, Economics and Politics: Perspectives on the Goals and Future
of Antitrust, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 2175 (2013); Wayne D. Collins, Trusts and the Origins of
Antitrust Legislation, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 2279 (2013); Harry First & Spencer Weber
Waller, Antitrust’s Democracy Deficit, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 2543 (2013); Eleanor M. Fox,
Against Goals 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 2157 (2013); Herbert Hovenkamp, Implementing
Antitrust’s Welfare Goals, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 2471 (2013); David A. Hyman & William
E. Kovacic, Institutional Design, Agency Life Cycle, and the Goals of Competition Law, 81
FORDHAM L. REV. 2163 (2013); John B. Kirkwood, The Essence of Antitrust: Protecting
Consumers and Small Suppliers from Anticompetitive Conduct, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 2425
(2013); Robert H. Lande, A Traditional and Textualist Analysis of the Goals of Antitrust:
Efficiency, Preventing Theft from Consumers, and Consumer Choice, 81 FORDHAM L. REV.
2349 (2013); Alan J. Meese, Reframing the (False?) Choice Between Purchaser Welfare and
Total Welfare, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 2197 (2013); Barak Orbach, How Antitrust Lost Its
Goal, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 2253 (2013); Steven C. Salop, Merger Settlement and
Enforcement Policy for Optimal Deterrence and Maximum Welfare, 81 FORDHAM L. REV.
2647 (2013); Maurice E. Stucke, Should Competition Policy Promote Happiness?, 81
FORDHAM L. REV. 2575 (2013); Joshua D. Wright & Douglas H. Ginsburg, The Goals of
Antitrust: Welfare Trumps Choice, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 2405 (2013).
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comparative analysis of welfare standards across E.U. and U.S. competition
systems10 and the impact of welfare standards on global antitrust
systemwide welfare. This analysis provides an opportunity to discuss
situations in which the difference between different standards—consumer
versus total welfare versus non-antitrust political factors—may lead to
disparate outcomes.11 The analysis’s comparative element is distinct from
its international element in that a difference across antitrust systems may
have a global impact. When there is a disagreement across antitrust
regimes as to welfare standards that have global impact, there may be, for
example, behavior that is forbidden even when it enhances total welfare
globally and should be permitted based upon the strictest major antitrust
jurisdiction to review the merger. This is only a small set of situations,
most notably efficiencies in a merger or joint venture context. Most of the
time, the welfare standard does not matter.12
In any discussion across legal systems about the goals of antitrust, one
must ask if there is substantive convergence, and if there is, is it a good
thing. The answer to the first question is both yes and no. There is some
global substantive convergence around the goals of antitrust. We believe
that this convergence is happening around a narrow competition economics
vision of the goals of antitrust, as we explore in Part I.
The process of antitrust convergence across countries is not easy.13
Institutional structures are a function of both the time in which they were
set up and the institutional development based upon this initial
endowment.14 This creates path dependence to institutional development
that makes the integration of new learning more difficult for some antitrust
10. Most recently summarized across the United States, Canada, Europe, and China in
Pingping Shan et al., China’s Anti-monopoly Law: What Is the Welfare Standard?, 41 REV.
INDUS. ORG. 31 (2012).
11. For a general conceptualization of regulatory competition, see Francesco Parisi et al.,
Two Dimensions of Regulatory Competition, 26 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 56 (2006).
12. Indeed, numerous articles suggest that maximizing consumer welfare will bring
antitrust closer to total welfare. See, e.g., Sven-Olof Fridolfsson, A Consumer Surplus
Defense in Merger Control, in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF ANTITRUST 287 (Vivek Ghosal
& Johan Stennek eds., 2007); Damien J. Neven & Lars-Hendrik Röller, Consumer Surplus
vs. Welfare Standard in a Political Economy Model of Merger Control, 23 INT’L J. INDUS.
ORG. 829 (2005), available at http://ces.univ-paris1.fr/membre/tropeano/pdf/polconc/artciles
0607/nevenrollersurplus.pdf; Bruce R. Lyons, Could Politicians Be More Right Than
Economists? A Theory of Merger Standards (Ctr. for Competition & Regulation, Revised
Working Paper No. CCR02-1, 2002), available at http://www.uea.ac.uk/polopoly_fs/
1.104451!ccr02-1revised.pdf.
13. See Eleanor M. Fox, International Antitrust and the Doha Dome, 43 VA. J. INT’L L.
911, 913–15 (2003) (explaining soft convergence in antitrust); D. Daniel Sokol,
International Antitrust Institutions, in COOPERATION, COMITY, AND COMPETITION POLICY 187
(Andrew T. Guzman ed., 2011) (suggesting the areas in which soft law antitrust convergence
are possible).
14. See William E. Kovacic, Creating Competition Policy: Betty Bock and the
Development of Antitrust Institutions, 66 ANTITRUST L.J. 231, 244–45 (1997); William E.
Kovacic, Designing and Implementing Competition and Consumer Protection Reforms in
Transitional Economies: Perspectives from Mongolia, Nepal, Ukraine, and Zimbabwe,
44 DEPAUL L. REV. 1197 (1995).
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systems (primarily agencies and courts) than others.15 Different path
dependencies complicate the possibility of convergence across systems for
any potential singular goal of antitrust.
Consequently, a number of factors are at play regarding antitrust
convergence. Law matters,16 macro level political economy factors
matter,17 as do the quality and ability of courts and agencies to shape
doctrine into policy.18 In the European Union and United States
comparison, a number of developments in the U.S. institutional framework
are different from those of Europe. They include private treble damages,19
a robust system of class actions,20 and a judicial-based enforcement system
(unlike the European administrative-based competition system).21 Private
remedies do not exist in a meaningful way in Europe, which might explain
stronger E.U. remedies by government enforcement22 if one assumes that
total enforcement (public and private) should be roughly the same between
the two jurisdictions.23
Other factors also shape the institutional path dependency of antitrust.
To a certain extent, it is history and politics, rather than efficiency, that
explain divergent antitrust systems, although economics’ application to
antitrust also plays a role.24 For example, many of the assumptions in the
15. D. Daniel Sokol, Antitrust, Institutions, and Merger Control, 17 GEO. MASON L.
REV. 1055 (2010) (describing institutional analysis within antitrust).
16. Keith N. Hylton & Fei Deng, Antitrust Around the World: An Empirical Analysis of
the Scope of Competition Laws and Their Effects, 74 ANTITRUST L.J. 271, 276–81 (2007).
17. Michal S. Gal, Antitrust in a Globalized Economy: The Unique Enforcement
Challenges Faced by Small and Developing Jurisdictions, 33 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1 (2009);
William E. Kovacic, Institutional Foundations for Economic Legal Reform in Transition
Economies: The Case of Competition Policy and Antitrust Enforcement, 77 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 265 (2001).
18. D. Daniel Sokol, The Future of International Antitrust and Improving Antitrust
Agency Capacity, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 1081 (2009); William E. Kovacic et al., How Does
Your Competition Agency Measure Up?, 7 EUR. COMPETITION L.J. 25 (2011).
19. Stephen W. Salant, Treble Damage Awards in Private Lawsuits for Price Fixing,
95 J. POL. ECON. 1326, 1327 (1987).
20. John H. Johnson & Gregory K. Leonard, Economics and the Rigorous Analysis of
Class Certification in Antitrust Cases, 3 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 341 (2007); William H.
Page, Introduction: Reexamining the Standards for Certification of Antitrust Class Actions,
21 ANTITRUST 53 (2007).
21. Thomas C. Arthur, Competition Law and Development: Lessons from the U.S.
Experience, in COMPETITION LAW AND DEVELOPMENT (D. Daniel Sokol et al. eds.,
forthcoming 2013); Javier Tapia & Santiago Montt, Judicial Scrutiny and Competition
Authorities: The Institutional Limits of Antitrust, in THE GLOBAL LIMITS OF COMPETITION
LAW 141 (Ioannis Lianos & D. Daniel Sokol eds., 2012).
22. See Per Hellström et al., Remedies in European Antitrust Law, 76 ANTITRUST L.J.
43, 58 (2009) (discussing E.U. remedies).
23. On the discussion of the relationship between public and private antitrust
enforcement see, for example, Jonathan B. Baker, Private Information and the Deterrent
Effect of Antitrust Damage Remedies, 4 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 385, 386 (1988); David Besanko
& Daniel F. Spulber, Are Treble Damages Neutral? Sequential Equilibrium and Private
Antitrust Enforcement, 80 AM. ECON. REV. 870, 883 (1990).
24. See DAVID J. GERBER, GLOBAL COMPETITION: LAW, MARKETS, AND GLOBALIZATION
(2010); DAVID J. GERBER, LAW AND COMPETITION IN TWENTIETH CENTURY EUROPE:
PROTECTING PROMETHEUS (1998); Arthur, supra note 21. There is a similar discussion in
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United States and its antitrust system—with a history of limited government
regulation and a dearth of state ownership—do not provide a direct analogy
to the competition regimes in Europe, which had more state intervention.
European competition law also has specific provisions regarding state aid25
(subsidies) and provisions specific to public undertakings.26
An additional policy, unique to the supranational nature of the European
Union, adds richness to European competition law goals. The initial focus
of the European competition system and European Union overall was to
integrate the economies of the member states. Moreover, competition
policy in Europe has had a more distributive flavor than its American
counterpart. There has been far more concern in European case law about
choices for consumers,27 even if preserving choice has translated into
enforcement policies that disfavor more efficient competitors.28
We recognize that institutions vary and that the current set of institutions
both within the United States and European Union (let alone other
competition systems) are not easily calibrated to ensure that total welfare
could be utilized as the singular value of antitrust/competition law. Indeed,
if anything, it seems to be consumer welfare that is the standard on which
there is increasing international convergence. However, the purpose of this
Article is to note that, because of the misalignment of institutional
capabilities and goals, certain fault lines emerge between competing
economic goals of antitrust as well as between political and economic
goals. We articulate where these fault lines are currently. We also note
corporate law regarding comparative corporate governance systems. See MARK J. ROE,
STRONG MANAGERS, WEAK OWNERS: THE POLITICAL ROOTS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE
FINANCE (1994) (describing a political and historic view of what shapes corporate
governance in the United States); Donald C. Clarke, “Nothing but Wind”? The Past and
Future of Comparative Corporate Governance, 59 AM. J. COMP. L. 75 (2011) (providing an
overview of comparative corporate governance scholarship); Mark J. Roe, Legal Origins,
Politics, and Modern Stock Markets, 120 HARV. L. REV. 460 (2006) (explaining comparative
corporate governance through political economy and historical factors); Andrei Shleifer &
Robert W. Vishny, A Survey of Corporate Governance, 52 J. FIN. 737 (1997) (discussing
how law matters to corporate governance).
25. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union art.
107, Mar. 3, 2010, 2010 O.J. (C 83) 91 [hereinafter TFEU] (limiting “any aid granted by a
Member State . . . in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition
by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods shall, insofar as it
affects trade between Member States, be incompatible with the internal market”). For
analysis, see KELYN BACON, EUROPEAN UNION LAW OF STATE AID (2d ed. forthcoming
2013).
26. TFEU art. 106; see also Case C-67/96, Albany Int’l BV v. Stichting
Bedrijfspensioenfonds Textielindustrie, 1999 E.C.R. I-5751, ¶ 79; Case C-49/07, MOTOE v.
Elliniko Dimosio, 2008 E.C.R. I-4863, ¶ 25; Joined Cases C-264/01, C-306/01, C-354/01 &
C-355/01, AOK Bundesverband v. IchthyolGesellschaft Cordes, 2004 E.C.R. I-2493, ¶ 58.
For academic treatment see, for example, Okeoghene Odudu, Are State-Owned Health-Care
Providers Undertakings Subject to Competition Law?, 5 E.C.L.R. 231 (2011).
27. See Paul Nihoul, Freedom of Choice—The Emergence of a Powerful Concept in
European Competition Law (June 5, 2012) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2077694.
28. See William E. Kovacic, Transatlantic Turbulence: The Boeing–McDonnell
Douglas Merger and International Competition Policy, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 805 (2001).
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particular situations in which a divergence of welfare standards either
matters or does not matter globally.29
This Article analyzes the United States and European Union because at
present, global antitrust is bipolar. That is, a global business strategy that
one of the U.S. antitrust agencies or the European Commission (EC)
successfully challenges may have global repercussions and may spell the
end to such a strategy in ways that would not be true if other jurisdictions
were to challenge a global deal. Future growth of Chinese and possibly
Indian economic power may impact the antitrust setting.30 The result may
be the creation of a multipolar world of antitrust for which a successful
agency action by either the United States, Europe, India, or China may
derail a business strategy whether it be via conduct or merger.31
Part I of this Article discusses the importance of the development of
economic analysis in U.S. and E.U. competition law to better explain how
the choice of an economic welfare standard has fundamentally become the
choice of a goal for antitrust/competition law. This discussion sets up our
substantive analysis of goals, where we analyze two types of situations in
which there would be a different outcome based on the goal implemented.
In Part II, we discuss the first scenario. This scenario involves resale price
maintenance (RPM). For RPM, we argue that even if there were a different
welfare standard across jurisdictions, it would have very little global
impact. In Part III, we analyze the question of different global standards
with regards to merger control. In this second scenario, we analyze a
difference in welfare standards between merger regimes where the use of
efficiencies might play out differently between the European Union and the
United States depending on the welfare standard used. Under this second
scenario, the welfare standard matters globally as to business outcomes in a
way that it does not under the first scenario. If one major merger regime
blocks the merger, it effectively blocks the merger globally.32 Part IV
29. Conceptually, total welfare of a given country actually means the sum of consumer
surplus and domestic firms’ profits. See, e.g., Pedro P. Barros & Luís Cabral, Merger Policy
in Open Economies, 38 EUR. ECON. REV. 1041 (1994). If, however, the consumer welfare
standard is adopted, then all firms should be treated equally.
30. See D. Daniel Sokol & William Blumenthal, Merger Control: Key International
Norms and Differences, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION LAW 319
(Ariel Ezrachi ed., 2012).
31. On antitrust developments in India, see Aditya Bhattacharjea, India’s New
Competition Law: A Comparative Assessment, 4 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 609 (2008);
Rahul Singh, India’s Tryst with “The Clayton Act Moment” and Emerging Merger Control
Jurisprudence: Intersection of Law, Economics and Politics, in COMPETITION LAW AND
DEVELOPMENT, supra note 21. On China, see, for example, Ping Lin & Jingjing Zhao,
Merger Control Policy Under China’s Anti-monopoly Law, 41 REV. INDUS. ORG. 109
(2012); Shan, supra note 10, at 31.
32. See Sokol, supra note 15, at 1094 (“On an international level, a key concern is when
one of the major powers in antitrust, the European Union or the United States, has a lower
standard for a finding of wrongdoing than other countries. The lower standard effectively
operates as the global standard because remedies often have global implications.”);
D. Daniel Sokol, Monopolists Without Borders: The Institutional Challenge of International
Antitrust in a Global Gilded Age, 4 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 37, 62 (2007) (“A single country
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provides our concluding thoughts on the future and desirability of
convergence around total welfare as the sole goal in the practice of
competition economics globally.
I. ECONOMIC ANALYSIS IN ANTITRUST VERSUS OTHER GOALS AND
DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE EUROPEAN UNION
This part explores the importance of goals in the implementation of
antitrust law and policy. It begins with an overview of the different types of
goals in antitrust. It then examines the shifts in goals over time in both the
United States and Europe. In the long run, antitrust goals have narrowed to
ones based on industrial organization economics. This is without question
the current state of play in the United States. In Europe, the shift to
industrial organization economics based goals is less well developed.
A. Goals
The potential goals of antitrust are numerous. Moreover, the goals of
antitrust in any given antitrust system may change over time.33 A current
snapshot of the different goals of the International Competition Network
(ICN) members shows the diversity and, at times, overlapping or
conflicting nature of the goals of antitrust. These goals include: ensuring
an effective competitive process, promoting consumer welfare, enhancing
efficiency, ensuring economic freedom, ensuring a level playing field for
small and mid-sized enterprises, promoting fairness and equality, promoting
consumer choice, achieving market integration, facilitating privatization
and market liberalization, and promoting competitiveness in international
markets.34
Noneconomic goals may play a role in some antitrust regimes. This
discussion is similar to the choice of goals in economic regulation
generally. There may be other areas of economic regulation in which other
legitimate factors get included in the goal. Regulation frequently seeks to
address issues relating to externalities, health and safety, industrial policy,

can hold up consummation of a merger, adding significant costs to or even scuttling the
proposed deal entirely.”). On the economics of international antitrust, see Oliver Budzinski,
International Antitrust Institutions, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST
ECONOMICS (Roger D. Blair & D. Daniel Sokol eds., expected 2013).
33. See, e.g., BORK, supra note 1; Eleanor M. Fox, The Modernization of Antitrust: A
New Equilibrium, 66 CORNELL L. REV. 1140, 1182 (1981); Herbert Hovenkamp, Distributive
Justice and the Antitrust Laws, 51 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1 (1982); Robert H. Lande, Wealth
Transfers As the Original and Primary Concern of Antitrust: The Efficiency Interpretation
Challenged, 50 HASTINGS L.J. 871 (1999); Daniel L. Rubinfeld, On the Foundations of
Antitrust Law and Economics, in HOW THE CHICAGO SCHOOL OVERSHOT THE MARK: THE
EFFECT OF CONSERVATIVE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS ON U.S. ANTITRUST 51 (Robert Pitofsky ed.,
2008).
34. See INT’L COMPETITION NETWORK, REPORT ON THE OBJECTIVES OF UNILATERAL
CONDUCT LAWS, ASSESSMENT OF DOMINANCE/SUBSTANTIAL MARKET POWER, AND STATECREATED MONOPOLIES 38 (2007), available at http://www.internationalcompetition
network.org/uploads/library/doc353.pdf.
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distributive justice, or financial stability among others.35 At times, some of
the goals are prone to risk of capture and present problems familiar within
the public choice literature.36 It is just that these other regulatory goals are
not considered in an industrial organization antitrust analysis, nor do we
think that they should be.
We believe that there are better mechanisms for achieving distributive
effects than antitrust. By distributive goals within antitrust, we mean either
distributive goals via the implementation of a consumer welfare standard or
through justifications that are not economics based within antitrust law.
Other mechanisms for distributive concerns, such as taxation, would be
more effective.37 As for the achievement of multiple goals that include the
promotion of competition concurrently with goals that may be pursued
through sector regulation, we believe that sector regulation is better suited
to address political tradeoffs because of its broader goals, such as “public
interest,” than is antitrust.38
Antitrust, as practiced in the modern, advanced jurisdictions, is more
predictable and better able to produce welfare-enhancing results than a
system based upon public interest concerns, in which interest group clashes
may predominate. This economic effects based form of antitrust is antitrust
technocracy.39 We prefer that the antitrust system be technocratic in the
sense that antitrust be defined narrowly to examine only those issues that
are purely within antitrust’s ability to be measured and understood using
industrial organization as the basis for economic analysis. This technocratic
approach moves noncompetition economic considerations to areas such as
sector regulation, the legislative process, or executive fiat. Such areas are
better equipped than antitrust to deal with political trade-offs between law
35. For an overview of the regulatory state and its justifications, see BARAK Y. ORBACH,
REGULATION: WHY AND HOW THE STATE REGULATES (2012); W. KIP VISCUSI ET AL.,
ECONOMICS OF REGULATION AND ANTITRUST (4th ed. 2005); Barak Orbach, What Is
Regulation?, 30 YALE J. ON REG. ONLINE 1 (2012), http://yale-jreg.org/what-is-regulation/.
36. See Fred S. McChesney et al., Competition Policy in Public Choice Perspective, in
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST ECONOMICS, supra note 32 (providing an
analysis of domestic public choice issues); D. Daniel Sokol, Explaining the Importance of
Public Choice for Law, 109 MICH. L. REV. 1029, 1041–48 (2011) (providing an overview of
international antitrust public choice issues). On public choice more generally, see DENNIS C.
MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE III (2003).
37. See Louis Kaplow, On the Choice of Welfare Standards in Competition Law, in THE
GOALS OF COMPETITIVE LAW 3, 5 (Daniel Zimmer ed., 2012). See generally, LOUIS KAPLOW
& STEVEN SHAVELL, FAIRNESS VERSUS WELFARE (2002).
38. See D. Daniel Sokol, Limiting Anticompetitive Government Interventions That
Benefit Special Interests, 17 GEO. MASON L. REV. 119, 133–35 (2009) (discussing public
interest goals of sector regulation and how they might clash with antitrust based analysis).
39. Generally, technocracy is a school of thought that governmental powers, especially
regulation, should be in the hands of industry experts and problem solvers. See Daniel A.
Crane, Technocracy and Antitrust, 86 TEX. L. REV. 1159, 1162 (2008). Antitrust
technocracy is more prevalent in the United States. See id. In Europe, “technocracy” seems
to be riddled with political trade-offs. See Chris Townley, Inter-generational Impacts in
Competition Analysis: Remembering Those Not Yet Born, 11 EUR. COMPETITION L. REV.
580 (2011); Chris Townley, Which Goals Count in Article 101 TFEU?: Public Policy and
Its Discontents, 9 EUR. COMPETITION L. REV. 441 (2011).
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and policy because of their ability to deal with conflicting policy issues,
whether based on legitimate goals or rent seeking.
There has been, and continues to be, convergence around the use of
industrial organization/competition economics as the basis for the analysis
of competition law/antitrust.40 We believe that it is merely a matter of time
until all of the major established antitrust regimes come to a point in their
institutional and case law development in which the only choices among the
goals of antitrust will be industrial organization based goals of total and
consumer welfare.41 Essentially, nonindustrial organization economic goals
and political goals will be pushed so far to the margin as to become
inconsequential. Developments to date suggest that this movement has not
been uniform, but the trend in many countries suggests that this is in fact
what is occurring.
B. U.S. Goals
In the United States, several goals have defined antitrust law as it has
developed, from those of the Sherman Act42 to the goals contained in
current case law and agency thinking.43 Over time the discussion of the
goals of antitrust has shed its overtly political elements in favor of goals
that are based on different economic welfare standards, largely as a result of
the Chicago Revolution.44
U.S. competition law enforcement and the institutions that support it are
evolutionary.45 The evolution occurs along a number of dimensions, such
as shifts in judicial interpretation, economic thinking, and government
40. See, e.g., ICN Recommended Practices for Merger Analysis, INT’L COMPETITION
NETWORK, http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/uploads/library/doc316.pdf (last
visited Mar. 19, 2013); ICN Unilateral Conduct Working Grp., Dominance/Substantial
Market Power Analysis Pursuant to Unilateral Conduct Laws, INT’L COMPETITION
NETWORK, http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/uploads/library/doc317.pdf (last
visited Mar. 19, 2013).
41. However, it remains unclear whether different antitrust systems will choose total
welfare, the policy choice we believe to be superior. This is the subject for a different
article.
42. See WILLIAM LETWIN, LAW AND ECONOMIC POLICY IN AMERICA: THE EVOLUTION OF
THE SHERMAN ANTITRUST ACT 53–99 (1965); RUDOLPH J.R. PERITZ, COMPETITION POLICY IN
AMERICA: HISTORY, RHETORIC, LAW 15 (1996); HANS B. THORELLI, THE FEDERAL
ANTITRUST POLICY: ORIGINATION OF AN AMERICAN TRADITION 227 (1955); Thomas J.
DiLorenzo, The Origins of Antitrust: An Interest-Group Perspective, 5 INT’L REV. L. &
ECON. 73, 75 (1985); Thomas W. Hazlett, The Legislative History of the Sherman Act Reexamined, 30 ECON. INQUIRY 263, 273–74 (1992); Richard Hofstadter, What Happened to
the Antitrust Movement?, reprinted in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE SHERMAN ACT: THE
FIRST ONE HUNDRED YEARS 20, 23–24 (E. Thomas Sullivan ed., 1991); George J. Stigler,
The Origin of the Sherman Act, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 4–5 (1985).
43. See, e.g., Einer Elhauge, Harvard, Not Chicago: Which Antitrust School Drives
Recent U.S. Supreme Court Decisions?, 3 COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L 59 (2007); Bruce H.
Kobayashi & Timothy J. Muris, Chicago, Post-Chicago, and Beyond: Time To Let Go of the
20th Century, 78 ANTITRUST L.J. 147 (2012).
44. See BORK, supra note 1.
45. HERBERT HOVENKAMP, THE ANTITRUST ENTERPRISE: PRINCIPLE AND EXECUTION
(2005).
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policies and priorities.46 As the antitrust statutes are purposely vague,
courts have developed and refined antitrust jurisprudence through the
common law47 and have increasingly used economic analysis to drive this
refinement.
The judiciary is a key player in the U.S. antitrust system through its
review of antitrust cases. By reviewing agency actions, the judiciary has
power to ensure that legal actions are upheld and enforced through
injunctive relief, disgorgement, and financial penalties. The more recent
focus on economics has reduced the areas of per se illegality and increased
the areas where the rule of reason operates because of procompetitive
justifications for the business behavior.48 A similar move has been
underway in the merger control area.49
With a shift to the rule of reason, courts now provide more in-depth
analysis. But even these courts have failed to understand how critical the
welfare standard is in this analysis.50 Thus, given the welfare standard,
courts (including the Supreme Court) remain confused as to how to
implement the rule of reason.51 This confusion creates circumstances in
which the use of a different welfare standard might lead to a divergent
outcome as between total and consumer welfare.
As a result of shifts in agencies and courts, sophisticated economic
analysis is now at the forefront of antitrust in the United States.52 Perhaps
46. DANIEL A. CRANE, THE INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE OF ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT
(2011); Sokol, supra note 15.
47. See generally William F. Baxter, Separation of Powers, Prosecutorial Discretion,
and the “Common Law” Nature of Antitrust Law, 60 TEX. L. REV. 661 (1982); William E.
Kovacic, The Modern Evolution of U.S. Competition Policy Enforcement Norms,
71 ANTITRUST L.J. 377 (2003); William E. Kovacic & Carl Shapiro, Antitrust Policy: A
Century of Economic and Legal Thinking, 14 J. ECON. PERSP. 43 (2000).
48. See Kobayashi & Muris, supra note 43, at 152–53 (“One result of the incorporation
of economics into antitrust law has been the widespread rejection of broad rules of per se
illegality.”).
49. See Hillary Greene, Guideline Institutionalization: The Role of Merger Guidelines
in Antitrust Discourse, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 771 (2006).
50. The prohibitions in sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act appear to be both
categorical and uncompromising. “Every contract, combination in the form of trust or
otherwise, or conspiracy” that restrains trade appears to be condemned under section 1.
15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006). “Every person” who monopolizes a market appears doomed by
section 2. Id. § 2. But the Supreme Court soon recognized that a literal interpretation of the
statutory language was both unwise and unworkable. The test of illegality quickly centered
on “reasonableness.” In United States v. Joint Traffic Ass’n, 171 U.S. 505, 558–60 (1898), a
section 1 case, and Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 81–82 (1911), a section 2
case, the Court found only unreasonable restraints or business practices to be unlawful under
the Sherman Act. This, of course, raises the obvious question of how reasonableness should
be determined; that is, what benchmarks or standards should be used to distinguish the
reasonable from the unreasonable? For the contemporary analysis of the rule of reason, see,
for example, Andrew I. Gavil, Moving Beyond Caricature and Characterization: The
Modern Rule of Reason in Practice, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 733 (2012).
51. See Blair & Sokol, supra note 4, at 474–81.
52. Liran Einav & Jonathan Levin, Empirical Industrial Organization: A Progress
Report, 24 J. ECON. PERSP. 145, 152 (2010) (“Thirty years ago, it was common for antitrust
arguments to rest on simple summary measures of industry structure such as concentration
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unique among legal fields, antitrust is one in which the Supreme Court
regularly cites not merely to law journal articles that employ economic
analysis but to economics journal articles. In its 2007 Leegin Creative
Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc. decision,53 the Supreme Court cited to
an economic textbook and articles from the Journal of Law and Economics,
RAND Journal of Economics, Quarterly Journal of Economics, and the
Journal of Political Economy.54
One anecdote illustrates the change within the United States perhaps
better than any other. When Richard Posner wrote his antitrust book in
1976, its title reflected the tension within antitrust legal scholarship and
policy of the time. Its title was Antitrust Law: An Economic Perspective.55
This was a provocative title. As one prominent scholar wrote in his review
of the book, “[Posner’s Antitrust Law] comes at a time when the limits of
traditional microeconomics as a tool of antitrust policy have become starkly
apparent, limitations which suggest that antitrust law should be moving
outside the economist’s world rather than burrowing more deeply into it.”56
By the time of the second edition in 2001, Posner’s title had been abridged
to Antitrust Law.57 The economic revolution was so complete that all
antitrust analysis has become economics based,58 and it was superfluous to
mention the economic perspective in the title.59
The change in discourse to one based on economics has framed antitrust
scholarship such that any goal other than total welfare must be framed
within an economic analysis lens. Many of those who embrace a consumer
welfare standard may do so based on their broad reading of the multiple

ratios and Herfindahl-Hirschman indices. Nowadays, the Department of Justice and the
Federal Trade Commission, which are tasked with reviewing proposed mergers, commonly
undertake sophisticated econometric studies to define industry boundaries and to assess the
likelihood of price increases or collusive behavior following a merger. These exercises often
draw on academic research, and in turn have motivated the development of new empirical
models.”); Vivek Ghosal, Regime Shift in Antitrust Laws, Economics, and Enforcement,
7 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 733 (2011) (providing empirical support of the shift to
economic analysis); Barak Orbach & D. Daniel Sokol, Antitrust Energy, 85 S. CAL. L. REV.
429, 439 (2012) (“The evolution of antitrust has been shaped by changing lines of economic
thinking and ideologies.”).
53. 551 U.S. 877 (2007).
54. Id. at 890–92, 921.
55. RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE (1976).
56. Harry First, Book Review, 52 N.Y.U. L. REV. 947 (1977).
57. See POSNER, supra note 6.
58. Kovacic & Shapiro, supra note 47, at 58–59.
59. Indeed, Harry First adopted economic analysis of antitrust in his writing. See, e.g.,
Peter C. Carstensen & Harry First, Rambling Through Economic Theory: Topco’s Closer
Look, in ANTITRUST STORIES 171 (Daniel A. Crane & Eleanor M. Fox eds., 2007); JOHN J.
FLYNN, HARRY FIRST & DARREN BUSH, ANTITRUST: STATUTES, TREATIES, REGULATIONS,
GUIDELINES, POLICIES (2011); Harry First & Andrew I. Gavil, Re-framing Windows: The
Durable Meaning of the Microsoft Antitrust Litigation, 2006 UTAH L. REV. 641; Harry First,
The Case for Antitrust Civil Penalties, 76 ANTITRUST L.J. 127 (2009); First & Waller, supra
note 9.
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goals of antitrust.60 From its inception, there were numerous goals of the
Sherman Act. As noneconomic goals of antitrust have been removed from
the U.S. discussion as a result of the ascendancy of the Chicago School, the
ideological fight over promotion of economic goals versus other goals has
given way to a debate about different economic conceptualizations of
welfare effects that approximate the more “populist” notions of competition
within an economics framework. In this current populist formulation, it is
consumer welfare that would be maximized at the expense of producer-andconsumer welfare.
C. E.U. Goals
There is a rich literature of the goals of European competition law.61
Though in the space of this Article we cannot do justice to various
approaches suggested, for purposes of this Article we do not need to. We
merely note that there is a difference in how competition law has been
conceptualized in Europe (and we exclusively deal with the E.U. level
rather than at the level of national competition authorities) and the various
goals to which competition law has been and continues to be applied. We
60. See, e.g., Joseph F. Brodley, The Economic Goals of Antitrust: Efficiency,
Consumer Welfare, and Technological Progress, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1020 (1987); John B.
Kirkwood & Robert H. Lande, The Fundamental Goal of Antitrust: Protecting Consumers,
Not Increasing Efficiency, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 191 (2008); Robert Pitofsky, Past,
Present, and Future of Antitrust Enforcement at the Federal Trade Commission, 72 U. CHI.
L. REV. 209, 217 (2005); Russell Pittman, Consumer Surplus As the Appropriate Standard
for Antitrust Enforcement, 3 COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L 205 (2007); Steven C. Salop,
Exclusionary Conduct, Effect on Consumers, and the Flawed Profit-Sacrifice Standard,
73 ANTITRUST L.J. 311, 329–33 (2006); Steven C. Salop, Question: What Is the Real and
Proper Antitrust Welfare Standard? Answer: The True Consumer Welfare Standard,
22 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 336 (2010).
61. See, e.g., GIULIANO AMATO, ANTITRUST AND THE BOUNDS OF POWER: THE DILEMMA
OF LIBERAL DEMOCRACY IN THE HISTORY OF THE MARKET (1997); RENATO NAZZINI, THE
FOUNDATIONS OF EUROPEAN UNION COMPETITION LAW: THE OBJECTIVE AND PRINCIPLES OF
ARTICLE 102 (2012); CHRISTOPHER TOWNLEY, ARTICLE 81 EC AND PUBLIC POLICY (2009);
BEN VAN ROMPUY, ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY: THE SOLE CONCERN OF MODERN ANTITRUST
POLICY? THE ROLE OF NON-EFFICIENCY CONSIDERATIONS UNDER ARTICLE 101 TFEU (2012);
Christian Ahlborn & Carsten Grave, Walter Eucken and Ordoliberalism: An Introduction
from a Consumer Welfare Perspective, 2 COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L 197 (2006); Eleanor M.
Fox, We Protect Competition, You Protect Competitors, 26 WORLD COMPETITION 149
(2003); Liza Lovdahl Gormsen, The Conflict Between Economic Freedom and Consumer
Welfare in the Modernisation of Article 82 EC, 3 EUR. COMPETITION J. 329 (2007); James
Kavanagh et al., Reform of Article 82 EC—Can the Law and the Economics Be Reconciled?,
in ARTICLE 82 EC: REFLECTIONS ON ITS RECENT EVOLUTION 3 (Ariel Ezrachi ed., 2009);
Frank Maier-Rigaud, On the Normative Foundations of Competition Law: Efficiency,
Political Freedom, and the Freedom To Compete, in THE GOALS OF COMPETITION LAW,
supra note 37; Giorgio Monti, Article 82 EC and New Economy Markets, in COMPETITION,
REGULATION, AND THE NEW ECONOMY 17, 40 (Cosmo Graham & Fiona Smith eds., 2004);
Alberto Pera, Changing Views of Competition, Economic Analysis and EC Antitrust Law,
4 EUR. COMPETITION J. 127 (2008); Heike Schweitzer, Parallels and Differences in the
Attitudes Towards Single-Firm Conduct:
What Are the Reasons?
The History,
Interpretation and Underlying Principles of Section 2 Sherman Act and Article 82 EC, in
EUROPEAN COMPETITION LAW ANNUAL 2007: A REFORMED APPROACH TO ARTICLE 82, at 119
(Claus Dieter Ehlermann & Mel Marquis eds., 2008).
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provide a basic overview merely, first, to set up our discussion of how
different goals may have an international dimension when goals are not
aligned and, second, to note what seems to be an increasing (though still
somewhat nascent) shift to a true consumer welfare standard.62
Unlike in the United States, the divide in Europe has not been between
total welfare and consumer welfare.63 Instead, the divide is between
different visions of competition—one based exclusively upon industrial
organization economics versus a mix of industrial organization economics
and noneconomic political goals. The latter mix encompasses an industrial
policy that favored European over non-European firms64 and a focus on
“fairness” that includes competitor effects and consumer choice.65 E.U.
competition law is one of a number of competing goals under the treaty and
these are bound together by the single market imperative.66 It was also
influenced by the Ordo-Liberal tradition.67
Although there is no explicit discussion of the goals of antitrust within
the current Treaty Establishing the European Community or its
predecessors,68 the Lisbon Treaty overall has certain goals, such as a
unified market, that at times work within a traditional competition
economics analysis for antitrust goals but at other times might lead to a
divergence.69 Some of these important factors suggest a focus other than
consumer welfare.70 However, since the E.U. competition system has been
modernized to reflect, among other things, an analysis more heavily based
on economics, the focus increasingly has been on consumer welfare,71 even

62. Bork sowed significant confusion with his use of “consumer welfare,” which in his
formulation was not consumer welfare at all but total welfare. See BORK, supra note 1, at
81–115.
63. But see NAZZINI, supra note 61, at 102 (arguing that dominance in Europe is based
on a total welfare goal).
64. Nihat Aktas et al., Market Reactions to European Merger Regulation: A
Reexamination of the Protectionism Hypothesis (Nov. 11, 2011) (unpublished manuscript),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1961188.
65. See TFEU pmbl.; see also id. arts. 119–120. For academic commentary, see AMATO,
supra note 61, at 2 (discussing consumer choice) and DAVID J. GERBER, LAW AND
COMPETITION IN TWENTIETH CENTURY EUROPE: PROTECTING PROMETHEUS 37–38 (1998)
(discussing the ordoliberal tradition and fairness). There is a certain similarity between these
conceptualizations and that of U.S. cases that have now been discredited such as Brown Shoe
Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
66. This is reflected in the fact export bans (i.e., preventing a distributor in one member
state from selling to customers in another) are treated as an ‘object’ agreement (as serious as
price fixing).
67. Nicola Giocoli, Competition vs. Property Rights: American Antitrust Law, the
Freiburg School and the Early Years of European Competition Policy, 5 J. COMPETITION L.
& ECON. 747 (2009).
68. Laura Parret, The Multiple Personalities of EU Competition Law, in THE GOALS OF
COMPETITION LAW, supra note 37, at 61, 63.
69. GERBER, supra note 65; VAN ROMPUY, supra note 61.
70. Parret, supra note 68, at 64–74.
71. For a general discussion, see PINAR AKMAN, THE CONCEPT OF ABUSE IN EU
COMPETITION LAW: LAW AND ECONOMIC APPROACHES (2012). For a discussion on both
procedural and substantive modernization, see David J. Gerber, Two Forms of
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if some suggest that a consumer welfare rationale within European
competition law might be at odds with the European Community Treaty.72
To the extent that the case law is shifting (as opposed to agency
decisions, guidelines, and discussion papers), the move to a serious
economic analysis is still at an early stage. To our knowledge, the first time
that the European Court of Justice (ECJ) ever used the term “consumer
welfare” was in its Post Danmark A/S v. Konkurrencerådet ruling of
2012.73 While Pinar Akman’s impressive work argues that total welfare
was closer to what the drafters had in mind when they drafted the Treaty
provisions,74 this interpretation of the goal of European competition law
remains a minority position.75 It also seems not to have been adopted by
E.U. case law. Rather, most court decisions formulate the goals of E.U.
competition law differently. In GlaxoSmithKline Services v. Commission,76
the ECJ noted:
62. With respect to the Court of First Instance’s statement that, while it is
accepted that an agreement intended to limit parallel trade must in
principle be considered to have as its object the restriction of competition,
that applies in so far as it may be presumed to deprive final consumers of
the advantages of effective competition in terms of supply or price, the
Court notes that neither the wording of [Treaty on the Functioning of the
European Union (TFEU) 101(1)] nor the case-law lend support to such a
position.
63. First of all, there is nothing in that provision to indicate that only
those agreements which deprive consumers of certain advantages may
have an anti-competitive object. Secondly, it must be borne in mind that
the Court has held that, like other competition rules laid down in the
Treaty, [TFEU 101] aims to protect not only the interests of competitors
or of consumers, but also the structure of the market and, in so doing,
competition as such. Consequently, for a finding that an agreement has
an anti-competitive object, it is not necessary that final consumers be
deprived of the advantages of effective competition in terms of supply or
price.
Modernization in European Competition Law, 31 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1235, 1256, 1263
(2008).
72. David J. Gerber, The Future of Article 82: Dissecting the Conflict, in EUROPEAN
COMPETITION LAW ANNUAL 2007: A REFORMED APPROACH TO ARTICLE 82, supra note 61, at
37, 46–49.
73. Case C-209/10, 2012 ECJ EUR-Lex LEXIS 2559, ¶ 42 (Mar. 27, 2012) (“[I]t is for
the dominant undertaking to show that the efficiency gains likely to result from the conduct
under consideration counteract any likely negative effects on competition and consumer
welfare in the affected markets, that those gains have been, or are likely to be, brought about
as a result of that conduct, that such conduct is necessary for the achievement of those gains
in efficiency and that it does not eliminate effective competition, by removing all or most
existing sources of actual or potential competition.” (emphasis added)).
74. Pinar Akman, Searching for the Long-Lost Soul of Article 82EC, 29 OXFORD J.
LEGAL STUD. 267 (2009).
75. DAMIEN GERADIN ET AL., EU COMPETITION LAW AND ECONOMICS 21 (2012) (“[This
approach] finds no clear-cut support in the wording of the Treaty . . . .”).
76. Joined Cases C-501/06 P, C-513/06 P, C-515/06 P & C-519/06 P, 2009 E.C.R. I9291.
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64. It follows that, by requiring proof that the agreement entails
disadvantages for final consumers as a prerequisite for a finding of anticompetitive object and by not finding that that agreement had such an
object, the Court of First Instance committed an error of law.77

A broader review of case law suggests multiple goals, both economics
based and noneconomics based.
The T-Mobile Netherlands BV v. Raad van bestuur van de Nederlandse
Mededingingsautoriteit decision78 provides another recent formulation of
the multiple goals of European competition law. It states, “[TFEU 101],
like the other competition rules of the Treaty, is designed to protect not only
the immediate interests of individual competitors or consumers but also to
protect the structure of the market and thus competition as such.”79 In
Konkurrensverket v. TeliaSonera Sverige AB,80 the court explained in the
dominance context:
Article 102 TFEU is one of the competition rules referred to in
Article 3(1)(b) TFEU which are necessary for the functioning of
that internal market. The function of those rules is precisely to
prevent competition from being distorted to the detriment of the
public interest, individual undertakings and consumers, thereby
ensuring the well-being of the European Union.81
Similarly, in the dominance context, the court has explained that “[TFEU
102] thus refers not only to practices which may cause damage to
consumers directly, but also to those which are detrimental to them through
their impact on competition.”82 This formulation seems to show concern
for competitors, consumers, and the functioning of the internal market.
These goals may at times be at odds with each other.
The ECJ has taken similar positions regarding multiple goals in Sot.
Lelos kai Sia EE v. GlaxoSmithKline AEVE Farmakeftikon Proionton83 and
T-Mobile Netherlands.84 Some of the recent case law in the Article 102
TFEU context suggests the protection of rivalry as a value in itself. These
cases include Konkurrensverket v. TeliaSonera Sverige AB85 and Visa
Europe & Visa International Service v. Commission.86 The move within
E.U. courts now seems at times even more expansive. Decisions emphasize
that the purpose of E.U. competition law is “to prevent competition being
distorted to the detriment of the public interest, individual undertakings and
consumers,”87 thereby ensuring the “well-being of the European Union”
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

Id. ¶¶ 62–64 (citations omitted).
Case C-8/08, 2009 E.C.R. I-4529.
Id. ¶ 38.
Case C-52/09, 2011 E.C.R. I-00527.
Id. ¶¶ 22–23.
Case C-280/08, Deutsche Telekom v. Comm’n, 2010 E.C.R. I-09555, ¶ 176.
Joined Cases C-468/06 to C-478/06, 2008 E.C.R. 7139.
Case C-8/08, 2009 E.C.R. I-4529.
Case C-52/09, 2011 E.C.R. I-00527.
Case T-461/07, 2011 E.C.R. II-01729.
Case C-52/09, 2011 E.C.R. I-00527, ¶ 22.
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both in TFEU 101 and TFEU 102 contexts. Whatever the mix of these
multiple goals, it is certainly not total welfare and not even clearly
consumer welfare.
Where there has been a noticeable change to embrace consumer welfare,
it has been from EC’s Directorate-General for Competition (DG
Competition) itself. Its Merger Guidelines make explicit the goal of
consumer welfare.88 The Commission similarly did so in its Article 82
Guidance.89 Overall, the shift towards consumer welfare exists both at the
level of top management90 and from the work product of the DG
Competition itself.91 It may very well just be a matter of time before
European courts embrace what is a clear attempt by DG Competition to
refine and narrow the goals of competition to the singular purpose of
consumer welfare. This same trend should shift, with time, convergence
among the national competition authorities toward the DG Competition
formulation of welfare goals.
D. Convergence of Economics in Antitrust Law
Even though a convergence of U.S. and E.U. case law towards a unified
economic-based standard remains distant, this divergence is not the case in
the academy, which has moved closer since the 1970s. The “A”
publications for European industrial organization economists are the same
for U.S. equivalents. Faculties attend the same conferences, write joint
papers, and teach together. The most important revolution in industrial
organization in the past thirty years has been the game theory revolution.
From this standpoint, it is interesting to note the fact that Jean Tirole
originally wrote his textbook—the standard graduate level economic
textbook around the world—in French rather than English.92 Thus, to a
certain extent, economic analysis of antitrust has already converged.93
88. EUROPEAN COMM’N, EU COMPETITION LAW: RULES APPLICABLE TO MERGER
CONTROL 184 (2010), available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/legislation/
merger_compilation.pdf.
89. Guidance on the Commission’s Enforcement Priorities in Applying Article 82 of the
EC Treaty to Abusive Exclusionary Conduct by Dominant Undertakings, 2009 O.J. (C 45)
9–10, available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2009:045:
0007:0020:EN:PDF.
90. Neelie Kroes, European Comm’r for Competition, European Competition Policy—
Delivering Better Markets and Better Choices, Speech at the European Consumer and
Competition Day (Sept. 15, 2005), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_
SPEECH-05-512_en.pdf (“[A]im is simple: to protect competition in the market as a means
of enhancing consumer welfare and ensuring an efficient allocation of resources.”).
91. Damien J. Neven, Competition Economics and Antitrust in Europe, 21 ECON. POL’Y
741 (2006).
92. JEAN TIROLE, CONCURRENCE IMPARTAIT (1985), translated in JEAN TIROLE, THE
THEORY OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION (1988). For a deeper discussion, see Daniel J.
Gifford & Robert T. Kudrle, Antitrust Approaches to Dynamically Competitive Industries in
the United States and the European Union, 7 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 695, 715–23
(2011).
93. This is true not only in Europe and the United States but elsewhere such as Australia,
Canada, Chile, China, Israel, Korea, and Japan, to name just a few other jurisdictions. See,
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Where there are differences, they seem to be at the margin—although hotly
contested in these areas.94
Differences remain in the use of economic analysis within the legal
scholarship across the Atlantic. First, the publication outlets are different in
the United States than in Europe. Second, economic analysis of law within
this field seems to be, on the whole (with some notable exceptions), less
used in Europe as European competition law scholarship is far more
doctrinal.95 The way in which law is taught contributes to this. There is far
less economic analysis of the cases in the leading European competition law
casebooks than in their U.S. antitrust law counterparts. Indeed, every single
major U.S. casebook has a Ph.D. economist among the casebook authors.96
This development is not unique to the field of antitrust/competition law.
Europe in general has been less receptive than the United States to the
economic analysis of law among law professors, although in Europe
economic analysis of law is more significant among economists.97
A snapshot of the current European law reviews provides evidence of the
different approaches to economic analysis of antitrust/competition law. We
compared the articles from the August 2012 issues of the European
Competition Journal98 and the Antitrust Law Journal.99 Of six articles and
a book review in the European Competition Journal, three articles reference
an economics journal in the footnotes and two of those articles have
economists as the author or coauthor. Of the remaining articles, only one
article referenced any economics journals. Compare this to the Antitrust
e.g., Leonardo J. Basso & Thomas W. Ross, Measuring the True Harm from Price-Fixing to
Both Direct and Indirect Purchasers, 58 J. INDUS. ECON. 895 (2010); Joshua S. Gans &
Stephen P. King, Paying for Loyalty: Product Bundling in Oligopoly, 54 J. INDUS. ECON. 43
(2006); David Gilo et al., Partial Cross Ownership and Tacit Collusion, 37 RAND J. ECON.
81 (2006); Zhiyong Liu & Yue Qiao, Abuse of Market Dominance Under China’s 2007 Antimonopoly Law: A Preliminary Assessment, 41 REV. INDUS. ORG. 77 (2012); Ki-Eun Rhee,
Collusion in the Presence of Externalities, 55 J. INDUS. ECON. 475 (2007); Ken-Ichi
Shimomura & Jacques-François Thisse, Competition Among the Big and the Small, 43
RAND J. ECON. 329 (2012); Ralph A. Winter, Colluding on Relative Prices, 28 RAND J.
ECON. 359 (1997).
94. See OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST ECONOMICS, supra note 32
(providing a literature review and discussions of convergence and divergence across a
number of different areas of antitrust economics).
95. Neven, supra note 91.
96. E.g., PHILIP AREEDA ET AL., ANTITRUST ANALYSIS: PROBLEMS, TEXT, CASES (6th ed.
2004); ANDREW I. GAVIL ET AL., ANTITRUST LAW IN PERSPECTIVE: CASES, CONCEPTS AND
PROBLEMS IN COMPETITION POLICY (2d ed. 2008); E. THOMAS SULLIVAN ET AL., ANTITRUST
LAW, POLICY AND PROCEDURES: CASES, MATERIALS, PROBLEMS (6th ed. 2009).
97. Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt & Carmen L. Brun, Lost in Translation: The Economic
Analysis of Law in the United States and Europe, 44 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 602 (2006);
Nuno Garoupa & Thomas S. Ulen, The Market for Legal Innovation: Law and Economics in
Europe and the United States, 59 ALA. L. REV. 1555 (2008); Oren Gazal-Ayal, Economic
Analysis of “Law & Economics,” 35 CAP. U. L. REV. 787 (2007).
98. See European Competition Journal, INGENTACONNECT, http://www.ingentaconnect
.com/content/hart/ecj/2012/00000008/00000002 (last visited Mar. 19, 2013).
99. See Antitrust Law Journal Archive, AM. BAR ASS’N, http://www.americanbar.org/
tools/digitalassetabstract.html/content/dam/aba/publishing/antitrust_law_journal/at_journal_
v78i1_full.pdf (last visited Mar. 19, 2013).
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Law Journal, in which ten of eleven articles cited at least several economics
papers, and the one article that did not reference an economics article was a
short afterword that summed up most of the other articles.
The lack of significant economic analysis within European law schools
means that the pipeline of both ideas and practitioners of economic analysis
in competition law is weaker in Europe than it is in the United States. In
the United States, it was the law-and-economics academy that first
transformed the analysis of antitrust, starting in the 1950s.100 The courts
followed, responding to the emerging scholarship. Courts began to shift
antitrust doctrine from per se to rule of reason (and greater economic
analysis) starting in the late 1970s, while at the same time transforming
procedural standards.101 These changes next influenced the antitrust
agencies,102 which in turn further strengthened the changes within the
courts.103
In Europe, where the legal academy has not been the driver of economic
analysis, the sequence has been different. It has been DG Competition and
the courts rather than the legal academy that have promoted greater use of
economic analysis of antitrust in Europe.104 However, all is not lost
regarding convergence of economic analysis of law. Indeed, the trend is
positive even within the European legal academy.
Additionally,
practitioners have acted as catalysts of convergence in Europe. Law firms
and economic consulting firms have offices on both sides of the Atlantic
and try to coordinate theories and analyses across antitrust agencies and
before courts.
International antitrust norms through international organizations such as
the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)
and ICN support some legal convergence around economic analysis. The
dynamics of these organizations allow them to help foster convergence
among countries around the world.105 Convergence within the international
antitrust realm has tended to be stronger around procedural rather than
substantive matters. Nevertheless, in those substantive areas in which
100. David S. Evans & A. Jorge Padilla, Designing Antitrust Rules for Assessing
Unilateral Practices: A Neo-Chicago Approach, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 73 (2005); Stephen
Martin, Remembrance of Things Past: Antitrust, Ideology, and the Development of
Industrial Economics, in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF ANTITRUST, supra note 12.
101. See Kobayashi & Muris, supra note 43; Kovacic, supra note 47.
102. RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMATICS OF MORAL AND LEGAL THEORY 229 (“More
judges and lawyers learned the rudiments of antitrust economics, and antitrust economists
became more effective as consultants and expert witnesses. It is fair to say that at the
beginning of its second century antitrust law has become a branch of applied economics, has
achieved a high degree of rationality and predictability, and is a success story of which all
branches of the law and allied disciplines can be proud.”); Richard A. Posner, Introduction
to Baxter Symposium, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1007, 1007–09 (1999); Richard Schmalensee, Bill
Baxter in the Antitrust Arena: An Economist’s Appreciation, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1317, 1323–
30 (1999).
103. Elhauge, supra note 43.
104. See supra notes 88–91 and accompanying text.
105. See Oliver Budzinski, International Antitrust Institutions, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST ECONOMICS, supra note 32; Sokol, supra note 32.
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convergence is possible, these organizations have helped foster
convergence around best practices, which allows for integration within
existing legal systems.106
Is this convergence a good thing? The answer is not straightforward.
Convergence is not the same as uniformity. Indeed, it would be naive to
think that antitrust has reached an end of history in which every country
interprets the same goal and applies it uniformly. Competitive pressures do
exist regarding ideas, and over time populist noncompetition economic
theories of antitrust have dwindled and been moved to other areas of
regulation across jurisdictions. However, this has not led to a uniform
standard, just as complex businesses themselves do not all share the same
internal organizational structures.107 Antitrust will not reach a single global
goal based on some sort of economic Darwinism where the marketplace of
ideas will eventually lead to the total elimination of competing theories.108
From an economic standpoint, convergence is positive if it leads to the
same analytical economic approach across jurisdictions, since this provides
for a certain level of predictability in both process and outcome.109 Without
convergence, developments in Europe will affect business behavior in the
United States. However, convergence may be problematic if it leads to suboptimal enforcement or if there is convergence around a suboptimal
standard. Thus, convergence around a better substantive standard would
allow for “trading up” and a race to the top, whereas bad standards would
force some countries to trade down and create a race to the bottom with
respect to regulatory standards.110
Below, we explore two situations in which there is a divergence in the
welfare standard for behavior between the United States and the European
106. John Fingleton, The International Competition Network: Planning for the Second
Decade, Address at the 9th Annual Conference in Istanbul, Turkey 4–5 (Apr. 27, 2010),
available at http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/uploads/library/doc617.pdf
(“The ICN has proven successful in developing international best practices in relation to
substantive standards, as we have seen in the areas of mergers and cartels, discussed above.
Similarly, the ICN provides a forum to discuss differences, a ‘marketplace for ideas’. The
ICN has also provided part of the underlying infrastructure for many bilateral and regional
improvements . . . .”).
107. See generally Richard R. Nelson, Why Do Firms Differ, and How Does it Matter?,
12 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 61 (1991).
108. See MILTON FRIEDMAN, ESSAYS IN POSITIVE ECONOMICS (1953) (providing a classic
analysis).
109. See David S. Evans, Why Different Jurisdictions Do Not (and Should Not) Adopt the
Same Antitrust Rules, 10 CHI. J. INT’L L. 161, 162 (2009) (“Divergence is hardly a happy
state of affairs for companies that compete in multiple jurisdictions. It is also a source of
tension among competition authorities that are working from different rulebooks, as they
jointly regulate the game of competition among firms playing on a world stage.”); Gifford &
Kudrle, supra note 92, at 695.
110. See Daniel J. Gifford & Robert T. Kudrle, Rhetoric and Reality in the Merger
Standards of the United States, Canada, and the European Union, 72 ANTITRUST L.J. 423
(2005). These issues of regulatory convergence and the theories behind them play out across
regulatory fields. See, e.g., CHRIS BRUMMER, SOFT LAW AND THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL
SYSTEM: RULE MAKING IN THE 21ST CENTURY (2012); David Zaring, Rulemaking and
Adjudication in International Law, 46 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 563 (2008).
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Union and the implications of those divergences. We begin with RPM and
then examine merger efficiencies.
II. TREATMENT OF RPM
There are some restraints that have been condemned under the antitrust
laws despite having ambiguous welfare effects. A prominent example is
RPM, which is when a supplier sells its product to a distributor on the
condition that the product not be resold below some specified minimum
price.111 The difference between the U.S. and E.U. approaches regarding
RPM has to do with the legal presumptions underlying each112—in the
United States, RPM is not presumptively illegal while in Europe it is. In
the verticals setting, there is no global systemwide antitrust problem. The
least common denominator problem tends not to be as significant because a
distribution strategy for end goods tends to be national.
A. U.S. Treatment
It has been argued that RPM can be used to facilitate a horizontal
conspiracy among manufacturers or among distributers.113 These cartels
are clearly undesirable and should be condemned. As price rises and
quantity falls, both consumer welfare and social welfare may be reduced.
Without some colorable claim of enhanced efficiency, the practice will have
no redeeming virtue and will fail a rule of reason test. But the existence of
an RPM program is not evidence of a horizontal price fixing conspiracy
among manufacturers or distributors.
The U.S. Supreme Court found RPM to be illegal per se in Dr. Miles
Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., a 1911 decision.114 After nearly
100 years, the Court overturned Dr. Miles in its Leegin decision.115 The
111. Prohibitions on resales above a maximum price do not have ambiguous welfare
effects. Such restraints promote both consumer welfare and social welfare. See Roger D.
Blair & John E. Lopatka, The Albrecht Rule After Khan: Death Becomes Her, 74 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 123, 168–69 (1998). This restraint is subject to the rule of reason. See
generally State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 22 (1997).
112. See Ulf Bernitz, Resale Price Maintenance in Comparative Perspective, in
RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION LAW, supra note 30, at 441–50.
113. RPM supports a cartel by making it more difficult to cheat. Lester G. Telser, Why
Should Manufacturers Want Fair Trade?, 3 J.L. & ECON. 86, 96–99 (1960) (explaining the
cartel motivation for RPM and pointing out the weaknesses in those uses of RPM). Herbert
Hovenkamp examines the background of Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co.
and argues that there was a widespread conspiracy among distributors that explained the use
of RPM in that case. See ENTERPRISE AND AMERICAN LAW: 1836–1937, at 342 (1991).
114. 220 U.S. 373 (1911). This decision has received a good deal of scholarly criticism
that began long ago. For an account of the early reactions, see William Breit, Resale Price
Maintenance: What Do Economists Know and When Did They Know It?, 147 J.
INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 72 (1991).
115. Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877 (2007). There has
been a wealth of commentary on this decision. For a sampling, see Special Issue, Antitrust
Analysis of Resale Price Maintenance After Leegin, 55 ANTITRUST BULL. 271 (2010),
available at http://www.federallegalpublications.com/antitrust-bulletin/201007/ab-2010-552-antitrust-bulletin-vol-55-no-2-summer-2010, as well as Thomas C. Arthur, The Core of
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weight of scholarly research, as discussed in the Leegin opinion, revealed
that RPM was neither invariably anticompetitive nor invariably
procompetitive. Consequently, a rule of reason analysis seemed necessary
to determine whether a particular instance of RPM was lawful or unlawful.
This is what Leegin now requires.
B. E.U. Treatment
In theory, RPM is not per se illegal under Article 101. However, it has
been treated as such under the block exemption116 and so, in practice, it has
the same effect as a per se violation under Article 101(1)117 (even though
the 2010 block exemptions recognize for the first time some form of
efficiencies argument under Article 101(3), which companies could in
theory use).118
The EC adopted its most recent vertical block exemption in 2010.119 A
block exemption in relation to vertical agreements did exist before 2010.120
What preceded that (pre-1999) was a messy system of individual
exemptions (through a notification system) and an inefficient system of
black and white listed clauses.
Though the 2010 block exemption came out after Leegin, the EC took a
different approach to RPM. The block exemptions are more restrictive in
some sense than U.S. measures. Under the block exemption, no distinction
is made between express RPM on the one hand and measures that may
serve to influence RPM on the other. Both are restricted where there is “a
minimum or fixed sale price as a result of pressure from, or incentives
offered by, any of the parties.”121 Restricting both types of behavior is
different from the approach used in the United States, where many priceAntitrust and the Slow Death of Dr. Miles, 62 SMU L. REV. 437 (2009); Elhauge, supra note
43; Avishalom Tor & William J. Rinner, Behavioral Antitrust: A New Approach to the Rule
of Reason After Leegin, 2011 U. ILL. L. REV. 805. As of this writing, there is pending
legislation that would amend section 1 of the Sherman Act to overturn Leegin. See, e.g.,
Discount Pricing Consumer Protection Act of 2009, H.R. 3190, 111th Cong. (2009),
available at http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/111/hr3190; Michael A. Lindsay, From
the Prairie to the Ocean: More Developments in State RPM Law, ANTITRUST SOURCE (Aug.
2012), available at http://www.dorsey.com/files/Upload/antitrust_lindsay_RPM_080712
.pdf.
116. Block exemptions allow for some level of safe harbor from competition law
enforcement. ARIEL EZRACHI, EU COMPETITION LAW—AN ANALYTICAL GUIDE TO THE
LEADING CASES 1 (3d ed. 2012) (“Agreements covered by block exemptions are presumed to
fulfil the conditions laid down in Article 101(3) thus relieving the parties to these agreements
from the burden under Article 2 of Regulation 1/2003 of establishing that the agreement
satisfies the conditions of Article 101(3) TFEU.”).
117. Commission Notice: Guidelines on Vertical Restraints, ¶ 223, SEC (2010) 411 final
(Oct. 5, 2010) [hereinafter 2010 Guidelines], available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/
antitrust/legislation/guidelines_vertical_en.pdf.
118. Id. ¶¶ 47, 223.
119. Commission Regulation 330/2010, on the Application of Article 101(3) of the Treaty
on the Functioning of the European Union to Categories of Vertical Agreements and
Concerted Practices, 2010 O.J. (L 102) 1 [hereinafter Block Exemption].
120. Commission Regulation 2790/1999/EC, 1999 O.J. (L 336) 21.
121. 2010 Guidelines, supra note 117, ¶ 226.
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affecting measures, including RPM, are presumptively legal.122 The
differences are not limited to price restraints but also include non-price
restraints where Europe (but not the United States) has drawn distinctions in
a number of areas, such as selective versus exclusive distribution123 and
online versus brick-and-mortar sales.124
One reason for the different treatment of vertical restraints in Europe may
have been the historic and path dependent concern about market
integration.125 This remains the case for the ECJ in its recent competition
vertical rulings; noncompetition economic arguments regarding market
integration trump all else in both Football Ass’n Premier League Ltd. v. QC
Leisure126 and GlaxoSmithKline.127 However, at the lower level, the
General Court in its GlaxoSmithKline decision has been more open to
competition economics based arguments,128 so perhaps over time a change
might be possible in European case law.
C. Promotional Uses of RPM
Several procompetitive motives have been offered for RPM.129 These
uses of RPM are promotional in nature and are intended to cause the
122. Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877 (2007); State Oil
Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 10 (1997); Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717,
726 (1988); Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 761 (1984); United
States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300 (1919). In Europe, vertical restraints outside of the
price area are less permissive than in the United States. These include lower market shares
than the United States, which is more stringent with regards to territorial restraints. See
FRANK WIJCKMANS & FILIP TUYTSCHAEVER, VERTICAL AGREEMENTS IN EU COMPETITION
LAW (2d ed. 2011).
123. Block Exemption, supra note 119, art. I(1)(e).
124. 2010 Guidelines, supra note 117, ¶ 58.
125. Giocoli, supra note 67, at 779–80. This is true not merely of vertical conduct but of
vertical mergers as well. See James C. Cooper et al., Vertical Antitrust Policy as a Problem
of Inference, 23 INT’L J. INDUS. ORG. 639 (2005) (discussing vertical conduct); Ilene Knable
Gotts et al., Nature vs. Nurture and Reaching the Age of Reason: The U.S./E.U. Treatment
of Transatlantic Mergers, 61 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 453, 471–72 (2005) (discussing
vertical mergers).
126. See Joined Cases C-403/08 & C-429/08 (Feb. 3, 2011), http://curia.europa.eu/juris/
document/document.jsf?docid=114111&mode=lst&pageIndex=1&dir=&occ=first&part=1&
text=&doclang=EN&cid=1019182.
127. See Joined Cases C-501/06 P, C-513/06 P, C-515/06 P & C-519/06 P, 2009 E.C.R. I9291; see also Bernitz, supra note 112, at 441–50.
128. Case T-168/01, 2006 E.C.R. II-2969.
129. See Telser, supra note 113 (discussing the product-specific services theory of RPM).
Marvel and McCafferty examined the role of RPM in protecting the investment of retailers
that certify the quality of the products they carry. Howard P. Marvel & Stephen McCafferty,
Resale Price Maintenance and Quality Certification, 15 RAND J. ECON. 346 (1984).
Springer and Frech examined the incentives retailers have for free riding on a manufacturer’s
reputation to the detriment of consumers. Robert Springer & H.E. Frech III, Deterring
Fraud: The Rule of Resale Price Maintenance, 59 J. BUS. L. 433 (1986) (providing
theoretical and empirical support for the beneficial use of RPM). Ackert argues that the
prestige associated with prestige goods stems at least in part from their price. Consequently,
that prestige can be lost through discounting, as consumers would begin to think of those
goods as ordinary. See George R. Ackert, An Argument for Exempting Prestige Goods from
the Per Se Ban on Resale Price Maintenance, 73 TEX. L. REV. 1185 (1995). Generally,
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demand function to shift rightward. The increase in demand will increase
the supplier’s profits, but it may also improve consumer welfare even
though the price rises. Under other circumstances, however, it will not
increase consumer welfare and may even reduce total welfare.
A clear case is illustrated in Figure 1, where D1 represents final good
demand without any promotional services and the supply is represented by
S1. In Figure 1, we analyze a simple case of unit demand. This is the case
in which a consumer will buy only one unit of the good in question.130 In
this case, the quantity sold also tells us how many consumers are in the
market. In the absence of promotional services provided by the distributors,
the equilibrium price and quantity will be P1 and Q1, respectively. Now,
suppose that the manufacturer wants its distributors to provide promotional
services that increase the demand for its product. For many consumers, the
promotions increase the value of the product. Because the value of the
product increases when these promotional services are performed, the
demand shifts from D1 to D2.131 Of course, these promotions are costly
and, therefore, the supply curve will shift from S1 to S2 to reflect the
increased cost. The new equilibrium is P2 and Q2. In this case, the
promotion not only leads to an increase in price from P1 to P2, but quantity
also increases from Q1 to Q2 because the vertical shift in demand exceeded
the vertical shift in supply.132
In this case, consumer welfare is unambiguously enhanced. Without the
promotion, consumer welfare is given by the triangular area cdP1. With
those promotions, however, consumer welfare rises to area abP2. This is
clearly larger—and always will be—as long as the shift in demand is
parallel and results in a quantity increase.133 Without promotion, producer
welfare is given by the triangular area deP1. With promotions, producer
welfare increases to triangle bfP2. This will also be larger as long as the
shift in supply is parallel and results in an increase in quantity.
Consequently, total welfare is given by the area of triangle cde without
RPM is a means of correcting an incentive alignment problem. This is highlighted in
Richard E. Romano, Double Moral Hazard and Resale Price Maintenance, 25 RAND J.
ECON. 455 (1994).
130. This assumption of unit demand is not critical to our analysis, but facilitates some
comparison of tradeoffs.
131. In Figure 5, we assume that D2 is parallel to D1, which means that every consumer
places an equal value on the promotional services. This, of course, may not be accurate; we
deal with that possibility below.
132. If this were not the case, the manufacturer would not push the promotional services
because it would not be profitable to do so. The derived demand for the product by the
dealers would fall rather than rise, and the manufacturer’s profits would suffer. Frederic
M. Scherer and David Ross point out that such services will be expanded until no further
gains exist. See F.M. SCHERER & DAVID ROSS, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND
ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 541–48 (3d ed. 1990). At this point, the increased cost of
additional services will be precisely equal to the increased value of the product resulting
from the increased services.
133. Triangles abP2 and cdP1 are similar because the corresponding angles are equal.
Since the base of abP2 is larger than the base of cdP1, the area of the former must be larger
than that of the latter. This will always be the case with a parallel shift in demand.
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promotion. With promotion, total welfare expands to area abf. In this
context, RPM is used in a way that improves both consumer welfare and the
manufacturer’s profits. This use of RPM would be lawful under a rule of
reason analysis regardless of whether the court is pursuing consumer
welfare or social welfare.
In the United States, the use of RPM depicted in Figure 1 would pass
muster; but in the European Union it would not. From an economic
perspective, this is a curious result. Consumers are clearly better off as a
result of Q2 – Q1. More people will consume the product; among
consumers, no one is worse off. Producer welfare also rises, so there is no
loss there. There are no losers, so a Kaldor-Hicks tradeoff is unnecessary.
This raises an obvious question: assuming that policymakers in the
European Union understand the economic analysis, what goals are they
pursuing? It could very well be that because of the vertical guidelines,
treatment of RPM may be framing the discussion in a way that it would not
otherwise be if one were to create a new block exemption from scratch. It
also may be that the nonindustrial organization economics goals may play a
larger role even in court cases. Because of the historic harsh treatment of
RPM, there is less empirical work in this area than other areas involving
vertical restraints, but the work to date suggests that the European approach
is not borne out by the economic evidence,134 and so European policy in
this area seems to accept noneconomic goals.
Below we show graphically the difference of outcomes across U.S. and
E.U. systems.

134. For a discussion of the empirical RPM work to date, see Benjamin Klein, Online
Resale Price Maintenance, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST
ECONOMICS, supra note 32; Francine Lafontaine & Margaret E. Slade, Franchising and
Exclusive Distribution: Adaptation and Antitrust, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL
ANTITRUST ECONOMICS, supra note 32.
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Figure 1: RPM Unambiguously Improves Both
Consumer and Total Welfare

In Figure 1, the parallel shift in demand from D1 to D2 indicates that all
consumers value the promotion equally (i.e., each consumer’s willingness
to pay increases by the same amount). This, however, may not necessarily
be the case, as all consumers may not value the promotions equally.135 In
our economic model, this means that the shift in demand will not be
parallel. In Figure 2, the promotion leads to a rotation of demand from D1
to D2. We have constructed this example so that the increase in price from
P1 to P2 and the increase in quantity from Q1 and Q2 in Figure 2 are
precisely the same as the corresponding prices and quantities in Figure 1.
In this case, consumer welfare without the promotion is equal to area acP1
and with the promotion equal to area abP2. In some cases (like the one
depicted in Figure 2) consumer welfare will decline even though RPM is
being used for promotional purposes. In other cases, however, it will
increase.136 Thus, the impact on consumer welfare is ambiguous on a priori
135. The economic consequences for consumer welfare were developed independently by
William S. Comanor and F.M. Scherer. See William S. Comanor, Vertical Price-Fixing,
Vertical Market Restrictions, and the New Antitrust Policy, 98 HARV. L. REV. 983 (1985);
F.M. Scherer, The Economics of Vertical Restraints, 52 ANTITRUST L.J. 687 (1983).
136. As a result, the appropriate antitrust policy is unclear. See Roger D. Blair & James
M. Fesmire, The Resale Price Maintenance Policy Dilemma, 60 S. ECON. J. 1043 (1994).
Richard Posner does not believe that this refinement can be handled in a judicial setting and,
therefore, should be ignored. See POSNER, supra note 6, at 176. Judge Posner may be right
as a practical matter, but ignoring this refinement necessarily abandons the consumer welfare
standard.
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grounds. As a result, the effect of RPM on consumer welfare is an
empirical matter. For all practical purposes, however, estimating the effect
of RPM on consumer welfare while controlling for all other influences is
problematic at best.
Figure 2: RPM May Improve Total Welfare but Reduce Consumer Welfare

In Figures 1 and 2, all of the corresponding prices and quantities are
equal. As a result, RPM can lead to identical price and quantity increases
but different outcomes for consumer welfare. In Figure 1, RPM is clearly
reasonable because both consumer welfare and total welfare increase due to
RPM and, therefore, is presumably lawful in the United States. In contrast,
the RPM plan depicted in Figure 2 is unreasonable in the sense that
consumer welfare declines, but may not be unreasonable on total welfare
grounds. Consequently, it is crucial to have a clear antitrust goal:
consumer welfare or total welfare.
Without such clarity, policy
prescriptions are murky at best. Producer welfare is the same in Figures 1
and 2 since the relevant areas are the same in both figures. Thus, the impact
on social welfare depends on the impact on consumer welfare. If RPM
causes consumer welfare to rise, then total welfare rises and vice versa. It is
therefore critical to determine the effect of RPM-induced promotion on
consumer welfare.
Determining the economic effect of RPM on either consumer welfare or
total welfare is complicated by the fact that there are no simple tests. It is
clear that neither an output test nor a price test provides an answer to the
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question of reasonableness. RPM is supposed to lead to higher prices, but
higher prices alone do not tell us what happens to welfare. As the results in
Figures 1 and 2 show, somewhat surprisingly, an output test also fails to
distinguish the effects on consumer welfare. Thus, it will be necessary to
embark on a difficult econometric journey to resolve the reasonableness
inquiry. It would seem that whoever bears the burden of proof will lose the
battle.
There is another circumstance that poses a severe challenge for the rule
of reason. Suppose that the producer introduced a new product and sold it
to distributors subject to an RPM policy. In that event, all we would know
is the price and quantity associated with the RPM-induced promotion.
There would be no information regarding the price and quantity that would
have resulted in the absence of the RPM-induced promotion. In that event,
we could measure consumer welfare, at least in principle, with RPM and
the promotion but not without the promotion. Thus, a rule of reason
analysis would be impossible, because there would be no way to determine
the effect of RPM on consumer welfare.
D. The OTCs and RPM
Online travel companies (OTCs), such as Expedia, Hotels.com, Orbitz,
Priceline, and Travelocity, provide information on flight schedules, airfares,
hotel room rates, and car rentals. In many respects, OTCs are travel agents
that are open twenty-four hours a day and, therefore, offer a more
convenient service than the traditional travel agent. As OTCs have grown
in importance, several legal issues have arisen. For the most part, OTCs
have attracted the attention of tax-starved states and municipalities over
forgone tax revenues.137 Most recently, however, RPM issues have
surfaced.138 These price restraints may receive different antitrust treatment
in the United States and the European Union.
Consumers may consult various OTCs when searching for hotel
accommodations. These sites provide information on availability and rates
in the destination city. The consumer may then contact the hotel’s
reservation system and book a room for, say, one hundred dollars. If the
applicable tax rate were 12 percent, the consumer would pay one hundred
and twelve dollars to the hotel, which would keep one hundred dollars and
transmit twelve dollars to the taxing authority.
The consumer could also book the room through the OTC. The hotels
provide discounts to the OTC of, say, 20 percent. In our example, the OTC
would pay eighty dollars for the room along with nine dollars and sixty
cents (i.e. 12 percent of eighty dollars) in taxes. The consumer would still
pay one hundred and twelve dollars pursuant to an agreement between the
137. See James Mak, What Should Be the Appropriate Tax Base for OTCs’ Hotel Room
Sales, 65 ST. TAX NOTES 775, 775–86 (2012).
138. See Benjamin Klein, Online Resale Price Maintenance, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST ECONOMICS, supra note 32 (discussing online RPM issues).
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hotel and the OTC that the OTC will not undermine the hotel by competing
with it through discounting. On this booking, the OTC will earn a gross
profit of twenty dollars through the discounted room rate and another two
dollars and forty cents because it pays taxes of nine dollars and sixty cents
while collecting one hundred and twelve dollars from the consumer. This
lost tax has been subject of much litigation.139
For our purposes, however, we are interested in the agreement between
the hotel and the OTC that the OTC will not use the discount to undercut
the hotel’s reservation system. In effect, the hotel sells the room to the
OTC at a wholesale price on the condition that the OTC not resell the room
below a specific price set by the hotel. This, of course, is RPM. There are
several antitrust issues surrounding these business practices.
First, the vertical agreements between a hotel and each of the OTCs
appear to be bilateral. That is, there is no evidence of agreement among
various OTCs. But may one infer agreement under the logic of Interstate
Circuit, Inc. v. United States140 in the United States or Toshiba Corp. v.
Commission in the European Union?141 Second, since the hotel is engaged
in a form of dual distribution, is it unreasonable for the hotel to avoid
competing with itself? In other words, is it unreasonable as that term is
used in the antitrust context to refrain from competing with the OTCs?
As described above, the hotel is engaged in dual distribution. It produces
hotel accommodations for travelers and sells directly to the consumer. It
also sells hotel rooms through the OTCs. In doing so, it hope to increase its
occupancy rates. But the hotel runs the risk of competing with itself, which
it wants to avoid through an RPM agreement with the OTC. This
agreement clearly restrains the OTC’s ability to reduce the price to the
consumer, but is that unreasonable? Presumably, the hotel would argue
that the OTC has reduced consumer search costs, which is a procompetitive
benefit of the dual distribution. It would also argue that it would abandon
dual distribution if it could not protect itself with the RPM agreement. This
argument (or one similar) may persuade a jury that the RPM agreement is a
reasonable restraint.
Now, suppose that the hotel has similar agreements with all of the major
OTCs. As long as these agreements are truly bilateral, each agreement can
139. See Mak, supra note 137.
140. 306 U.S. 208, 221–28 (1939).
141. Case T-113/07, ¶ 82 (July 12, 2011), http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/
document.jsf?docid=107961&mode=lst&pageIndex=1&dir=&occ=first&part=1&text=&doc
lang=EN&cid=1021087 (“[T]he Commission cannot be required to produce documents
expressly attesting to contacts between the traders concerned. The fragmentary and sporadic
items of evidence which may be available to the Commission should, in any event, be
capable of being supplemented by inferences which allow the relevant circumstances to be
reconstituted. The existence of an anti-competitive practice or agreement may therefore be
inferred from a number of coincidences and indicia which, taken together, can, in the
absence of another plausible explanation, constitute evidence of an infringement . . . .”); see
also Joined Cases C-204/00 P, C-205/00 P, C-211/00 P, C-213/00 P, C-217/00 P & C219/00 P, Aalborg Portland A/S v. Comm’n, 2004 E.C.R. I-123; Case C-199/92 P, Hüls AG
v. Comm’n, 1999 E.C.R. I-4287.
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be supported by the same claim of reasonableness. To the extent that each
OTC honors its agreement with the hotel, there will be no price competition
among the OTCs. This, however, should not undermine the reasonableness
of the RPM agreements.
Contrary to this hypothetical, however, suppose that there is an
agreement among the OTCs not to compete with one another. This would
make these bilateral agreements a horizontal agreement that unreasonably
denies consumers the benefits of price competition and should therefore be
deemed unlawful under section 1 of the Sherman Act.142
Another complicating factor is that the major hotels that presumably
compete with one another have similar RPM agreements with the OTCs.143
This in itself is not indicative of horizontal collusion among the hotels but
may suggest to some that there is a restraint on competition.
E. Recent Litigation Regarding RPM and OTCs
In the United Kingdom, the Office of Fair Trading (OFT) has filed a
Statement of Objections against IHG and others that challenges the RPM
agreements that prevent OTCs from undercutting the hotel reservations
systems. These supposedly bilateral agreements will prevent price
competition among the OTCs.144 There are complaints from smaller OTCs
that the larger OTCs demand that the hotels prevent discounting. This
alone, however, is not suspicious. After all, if a large OTC honors its
bilateral agreement with a hotel, it necessarily will resent being undercut by
another OTC that is not honoring a similar agreement.
In the United States, a consumer class action has been filed alleging that
the RPM agreement is rigorously enforced against smaller OTCs so that the
larger OTCs do not face price competition.145 In essence, the complaint
alleges a horizontal rather than a vertical restraint. If such an agreement is
proven, it will violate section 1 of the Sherman Act. If, however, the RPM
agreements between each OTC and each hotel are simply a collection of
bilateral agreements, then the RPM agreements will have to be proven to be
unreasonable.
III. MERGERS
In this part, we give a historic overview of the development of merger
enforcement in the United States and European Union and examine the
legal context of merger efficiencies. Thereafter, we provide an analysis of
how a proposed merger might be impacted by disparate merger standards
142. See United States v. Sealy, Inc., 388 U.S. 350 (1967).
143. Posner has found industry-wide use of RPM suspicious. POSNER, supra note 6, at
67–68.
144. Press Release, Office of Fair Trading, Statement of Objections against Booking.com,
Expedia and Intercontinental Hotels Group (July 31, 2012), available at http://www.oft.gov
.uk/news-and-updates/press/2012/65-12.
145. Class Action Complaint, Turik v. Expedia Inc., No. 12CV04365 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 20,
2012), 2012 WL 3568787.
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across major jurisdictions. The difference in outcomes can be seen through
the example of the use of efficiencies arguments in case law regarding
mergers. In both cases, the dominant approach seems to be consumer
welfare in both the United States and the European Union.
Oliver Williamson first identified the efficiency trade-off raised by
merger-specific efficiencies that may accompany an increase in monopoly
power postmerger.146 There are some instances in which a business
practice improves efficiency (i.e., reduces costs of production and/or
distribution). The easy case is one in which the merger does not enhance
market power. As a result, cost savings from the merger will be passed on
to some extent to consumers in the form of lower prices. This case is easy
because the merger increases both consumer welfare and total welfare.
The more difficult case occurs when the improved efficiency
accompanies increased market power postmerger that leads to a price
increase above the previous level. This situation creates a need to weigh the
benefits of improved efficiency against the costs of allocative inefficiency,
since this merger should be allowed on total welfare grounds but not on
consumer welfare grounds. Before we examine these cases, we provide a
review of how merger analysis has developed.
A. Merger Goals, Efficiencies, and Antitrust Systems
This section traces the development of merger control in the United
States, the first antitrust system to create a robust merger-control regime
that includes merger guidelines to shape practice before agencies and
courts. This section then examines the development of U.S. merger case
law regarding efficiencies. Thereafter, it undertakes a similar analysis
regarding European merger-efficiencies case law before noting areas of
divergence between the two systems. Finally, the section explains the
economics of how different welfare standards could lead to disparate
outcomes in the decision to allow or block a merger and how this might
have a global impact.
1. Historic Overview of U.S. Mergers
Perhaps more than any other antitrust system, the United States’
experience with merger control has shown the most dramatic shift from the
influence of overt political factors to sole primacy of industrial organization
economics considerations.147 Antitrust case law began to reflect the shift
146. See Oliver E. Williamson, Economies As an Antitrust Defense: The Welfare
Tradeoffs, 58 AM. ECON. REV. 18 (1968).
147. For example, in the United States, even though the economic understanding of cases
such as Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962), and United States v.
Philadelphia National Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963), is retrograde by today’s standards,
agencies still cite to them when they want to block a merger. The latest methods in
industrial organization recommend the least amount possible of political intrusion specific to
industrial organization economics into antitrust policy. See ULRICH SCHWALBE & DANIEL
ZIMMER, LAW AND ECONOMICS IN EUROPEAN MERGER CONTROL (2009); Mats A. Bergman et
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from political factors to industrial organization economics in the late 1970s,
although the change specifically in merger case law lagged a bit relative to
the abolition of per se rules regarding conduct.148 As Judge Ginsburg has
noted in the case law development,
Even in such cases where there is no consensus among economists, there
is, nevertheless, virtually universal agreement among antitrust economists
and lawyers alike, that the Court should answer questions of antitrust law
with reference to economic competition—matters of consumer welfare
and economic efficiency—rather than make political judgments about
such economically irrelevant matters as the “freedom of traders,” or “the
desirability of retaining ‘local control’ over industry and the protection of
small businesses.”149

Classic merger cases such as Brown Shoe Co. v. United States,150 United
States v. Von’s Grocery Co.,151 and United States v. Philadelphia National
Bank152 would be decided quite differently both in approach and outcome
today. Moreover, changes in priorities became embedded not merely in the
case law but also in the agencies with the rise in the importance of
economics.
The introduction of economically informed merger guidelines has created
a framework to analyze mergers, and the approach of writing and
operationalizing guidelines has been copied in many of the world’s
jurisdictions. The importance of the merger guidelines to antitrust merger
and the use of various economic theories and approaches have been
tremendous. There has been an iterative process of tweaking the guidelines
as the economics of the time have changed. This has been true in the
United States with each iteration of the merger guidelines—1968, 1982,
1984, 1992, 1997, and 2010.153 This economic approach based upon the
merger guidelines has become embedded within U.S. case law.154
Scholars have quantified the shift of merger enforcement. Indeed, there
is much empirical literature examining the political economy of federal
government antitrust enforcement. Judge Posner first set the stage by
examining data on the Department of Justice antitrust litigation.155 Others

al., Comparing Merger Policies in the European Union and the United States, 36 REV.
INDUS. ORG. 305 (2010); Tomaso Duso et al., An Empirical Assessment of the 2004 EU
Merger Policy Reform (WZB, Discussion Paper SP II 2010-16, 2010), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1721412.
148. See Greene, supra note 49.
149. Leah Brannon & Douglas H. Ginsburg, Antitrust Decisions of the U.S. Supreme
Court, 1967 to 2007, at 3 COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L 2, 22 (2007) (quoting Albrecht v. Herald
Co., 390 U.S. 145, 152 (1968); Brown Shoe Co., 370 U.S. at 315–16).
150. 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
151. 384 U.S. 270 (1966).
152. 374 U.S. 321 (1963).
153. Sokol, supra note 15, at 1105–09.
154. See generally Greene, supra note 49.
155. Richard A. Posner, A Statistical Study of Antitrust Enforcement, 13 J.L. & ECON.
365, 402 (1970).
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have since updated, revised, and extended his work.156 Collectively, the
empirical evidence shows that (1) there is no consistent relationship
between the party of the President and federal antitrust enforcement, and (2)
the relationship between aggregate economic activity and federal antitrust
case-activity is ambiguous—the typical finding being a weak-positive or no
link. Empirical work suggests that overt industrial organization economics
based politics has, for the most part, become a nonissue in U.S. merger
enforcement in recent decades (1990s onwards). As Malcolm Coate states,
“Populism was forced to a fringe position.”157 This is a change from earlier
studies of U.S. merger control that examined the 1980s and suggested that
there were noneconomic factors at play in merger control.158
Examining even earlier merger enforcement, and given the current state
of industrial organization economics, U.S. merger enforcement and case
law from the 1950s and 1960s is an intellectual embarrassment. The
agency priorities and case law reflected the idea that big was bad and that
the protection of competitors mattered more than some notion of
efficiency.159 In a large sense, overt noneconomic political factors mattered
most within antitrust merger analysis.160
2. E.U. Mergers Historic Overview
Empirical work that analyzes the pre–“effects based” period of European
merger enforcement shows that protectionism existed in merger control in
terms of deals challenged. The analyses show that DG Competition had a
156. Malcolm B. Coate et al., Bureaucracy and Politics in FTC Merger Challenges,
33 J.L. & ECON. 463, 481–82 (1990); Roger L. Faith et al., Antitrust Pork Barrel, 25 J.L. &
ECON. 329, 339 (1982); Joseph C. Gallo et al., Department of Justice Antitrust Enforcement,
1955–1997: An Empirical Study, 17 REV. INDUS. ORG. 75, 94–95 (2000); Vivek Ghosal,
Regime Shift in Antitrust Laws, Economics, and Enforcement, 7 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON.
733, 736, 740, 759 (2011); John J. Siegfried, The Determinants of Antitrust Activity, 18 J.L.
& ECON. 559, 561 (1975).
157. Malcolm B. Coate, Bush, Clinton, Bush: Twenty Years of Merger Enforcement at
the Federal Trade Commission 19 (Sept. 2009) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1314924; see also Daniel A. Crane, Has
the Obama Justice Department Reinvigorated Antitrust Enforcement?, 65 STAN. L. REV.
ONLINE 13 (2012), http://www.stanfordlawreview.org/sites/default/files/online/articles/
65_Stan._L._Rev._Online_13.pdf. But see Jonathan B. Baker & Carl Shapiro,
Reinvigorating Horizontal Merger Enforcement, in HOW THE CHICAGO SCHOOL OVERSHOT
THE MARK, supra note 33, at 235, 248–51.
158. Malcolm B. Coate, A Test of Political Control of the Bureaucracy: The Case of
Mergers, 14 ECON. & POL. 1 (2002).
159. FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568, 574–75 (1967); In re Foremost
Dairies, Inc., 60 F.T.C. 944, 1084 (1962). This approach was not limited to mergers, but
also applied in the monopolization setting. See United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am.,
148 F.2d 416, 428 (2d Cir. 1945) (“[G]reat industrial consolidations are inherently
undesirable, regardless of their economic results.”).
160. See, e.g., Jonathan B. Baker, Preserving a Political Bargain: The Political Economy
of the Non-interventionist Challenge to Monopolization Enforcement, 76 ANTITRUST L.J.
605 (2010) (exploring the broader political bargain of antitrust); Robert Pitofsky, The
Political Content of Antitrust, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 1051, 1051 (1979) (providing a defense of
noneconomic factors).
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higher probability of intervention against non-European firms when there
were European competitors in the same market.161 This supports the view
that the welfare standard (at least at that time) was not a traditional
consumer or total welfare standard but one that included non-antitrust
economic factors.
Things have changed in Europe. Empirical work that focuses on more
recent European merger control suggests that protection of European firms
from non-European firms is no longer a factor within European level
merger control.162 With time, European merger analysis has improved, as
European merger law has increasingly featured economic analysis as a
result of certain doctrinal and structural changes.163 Changes have included
reform via the 2004 Horizontal Merger Guidelines,164 which made
economic analysis a more vital part of merger analysis, case law
developments (Airtours/First Choice,165 Schneider/Legrand,166 and Tetra
Laval/Sidel167),168 and the creation within DG Competition of the chief
economist position and an economics group that is not subservient to the
legal team in its analysis.169
161. Nihat Aktas et al., Is European M&A Regulation Protectionist?, 117 ECON. J. 1096,
1117–18 (2007); Tomaso Duso et al., The Political Economy of European Merger Control:
Evidence Using Stock Market Data, 50 J.L. & ECON. 455 (2007); Serdar Dinç & Isil Erel,
Economic Nationalism in Mergers & Acquisitions (May 18, 2012) (unpublished
manuscript), available at http://fisher.osu.edu/fin/faculty/erel/papers/Dinc_Erel_2012May18
.pdf. On the use of financial stock market return event studies for competition policy, see
Tomaso Duso et al., Is the Event Study Methodology Useful for Merger Analysis? A
Comparison of Stock Market and Accounting Data, 30 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 186 (2010).
162. Nihat Aktas et al., Market Reactions to European Merger Regulation: A
Reexamination of the Protectionism Hypothesis (Nov. 15, 2011) (unpublished manuscript),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1961188. However, it does
still seem to be the case that in at least certain high profile circumstances, member state–
level protectionism is alive and well within Europe. See Damien Geradin & Ianis Girgenson,
Industrial Policy and European Merger Control—A Reassessment, in FORDHAM
COMPETITION LAW INSTITUTE 353 (Barry E. Hawk ed., 2011).
163. Nicholas Levy, Evidentiary Issues in EU Merger Control, in ANNUAL PROCEEDINGS
OF THE FORDHAM COMPETITION LAW INSTITUTE: INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST LAW & POLICY
81 (Barry E. Hawk ed., 2009); Orbach & Sokol, supra note 52, at 446.
164. Guidelines on the Assessment of Horizontal Mergers Under the Council Regulation
on the Control of Concentrations Between Undertakings, 2004 O.J. (C 31) 5, 14.
165. Case IV/M.524, 2000 O.J. (L 93) 1, overruled by Case T-342/99, Airtours v.
Comm’n, 2002 E.C.R. II-2585.
166. Case COMP/M.2283, 2004 O.J. (L 101) 1, overruled by Case T-310/01, Schneider
Electric SA v. Comm’n, 2002 E.C.R. II-4071.
167. Case COMP/M.2416, 2004 O.J. (L 43) 13, overruled by Case T-5/02, Tetra Laval
BV v. Comm’n, 2002 E.C.R. II-4381; Case COMP/M.2416, Tetra Laval/Sidel, 2004 O.J. (L
38) 1, overruled by Case T-80/02, Tetra Laval BV v. Comm’n, 2002 E.C.R. II-4519.
168. See ULRICH SCHWALBE & DANIEL ZIMMER, LAW AND ECONOMICS IN EUROPEAN
MERGER CONTROL (2009); Mark Leddy et al., Transatlantic Merger Control: The Courts
and the Agencies, 43 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 25, 42 (2010); Duso et al., supra note 147.
169. Luke M. Froeb et al., The Economics of Organizing Economists, 76 ANTITRUST L.J.
569 (2009). A similar trend occurred earlier in the United States. Oliver Williamson notes,
“Taken together, the creation of the position of Special Economic Assistant and the decision
to staff the evaluation section with young lawyers who bought into the idea that economic
reasoning should be featured more prominently in antitrust enforcement were important
‘organizational innovations.’ For those who were a part of this transition, these were
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Since that time, the role of economics (and economists) has grown both
within DG Competition and among economic experts who regularly appear
before Commission staff.170 Yet, the earlier case law and institutional
approaches have impacted the current structure and nature of merger
enforcement in Europe in terms of state intervention. Quantitative research
supports that, at present, Europe is a stricter enforcer of merger regulation
than the United States.171
3. Examples of Merger Divergence
It has been quite some time since the substantive merger standard has
mattered across regimes. What we have seen overall is that after a period of
substantive divergence in merger control as it relates (in part) to economic
analysis,172 increasingly there is convergence between the United States and
the European Union as to substantive analysis of mergers.173 Yet, a number
of high profile cases regarding mergers that involved significant merger
scrutiny over a decade ago demonstrated that the more stringent legal
regime could have global consequences. These included most notably
Boeing/McDonnell Douglas,174 General Electric/Honeywell,175 and
Oracle/PeopleSoft.176 In each of these three cases, had either the United
States or the European Union blocked the merger, the deal would have had
to be abandoned as a condition of closing. Of these three deals, the one that
created the greatest transatlantic rift was GE/Honeywell, which the United

exciting times.” Oliver E. Williamson, The Merger Guidelines of the U.S. Department of
Justice—In Perspective 1 (June 4, 2002), available at http:// www.justice.gov/atr/hmerger/
11257.pdf.
170. Neven, supra note 91.
171. Mats A. Bergman et al., Atlantic Divide or Gulf Stream Convergence: Merger
Policies in the European Union and the United States (April 13, 2010) (unpublished
manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=975102.
172. Jeremy Grant & Damien J. Neven, The Attempted Merger Between General Electric
and Honeywell: A Case Study of Transatlantic Conflict, 1 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 595
(2005); Kovacic, supra note 28.
173. Mats Bergman et al., Merger Control in the European Union and the United States:
Just the Facts (March 4, 2010) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers
.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1565026; Florian Szücs, Investigating Transatlantic
Merger Policy Convergence (Feb. 22, 2012) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1773774.
174. See Case IV/M.877, 1997 O.J. (L 335); see also Statement of Chairman Robert
Pitofsky and Commissioners Janet D. Steiger, Roscoe B. Starek III and Christine A. Varney
in the Matter of The Boeing Company/McDonnell Douglas Corporation, FTC,
www.ftc.gov/opa/1997/07/boeingsta.shtm (last modified June 24, 2011).
175. See Case COMP/M.2220, 2001, 2004 O.J. (L 48) 1, prohibition aff’d, Case T209/01, Honeywell Int’l, Inc. v. Comm’r, 2005 E.C.R. II-05527; see also Press Release,
Dep’t of Justice, Statement by Assistant Attorney General Charles A. James on the EU’s
Decision Regarding the GE/Honeywell Acquisition (July 3, 2001), available at
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2001/July/303at.htm.
176. See United States v. Oracle Corp., 331 F. Supp. 2d 1098 (N.D. Cal. 2004); Case
COMP/M.3216, Oracle/PeopleSoft, 2004, 2005 O.J. (L 218).
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States approved but the European Union blocked.177 The effect of the E.U.
action was to block the deal globally. 178
We will now review these mergers to demonstrate that a divergence in
merger standards can have global results in a way that a divergence in RPM
standards cannot. We begin with a short review of GE/Honeywell.179
The proposed GE/Honeywell deal received merger clearance in the
United States but was blocked within Europe based on the theory of a
bundling of GE’s engines with its financial services at a price that was
below what its rivals could offer. Third-party complaints drove much of the
hostility of the EC but so did a path dependency based on political
considerations on the view of competition in Europe.
European
competition policy, at the time, was far more likely to be about the
preservation of competitors than that of the United States. Thus, even if
there were not some overt public choice explanation for the strategic use of
antitrust, institutional factors also pushed DG Competition to block the deal
in Europe and, in effect, to block the deal globally.180
In Oracle/PeopleSoft, the EC approved the merger but did so using the
same unilateral effects theory that the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) had
suggested to block the deal. Unlike Boeing/McDonnell Douglas and
GE/Honeywell, the Europeans agreed with the market definition employed
by DOJ and yet somehow still cleared the merger after DOJ had lost its
merger challenge to the deal before a district court. This is puzzling since,
if DG Competition accepted the DOJ market definition, the three-to-two
merger most probably should have been challenged by DG Competition
based on a unilateral effects theory.
Politics seems to have played a role in the decision not to challenge the
Oracle/PeopleSoft merger in Europe. Because of the very thorough opinion
that would have made an appeal incredibly difficult to win, DOJ decided
not to appeal the ruling. Had economic analysis been at the forefront of the
European decision making, this would have created a potential problem.
By challenging a deal that could proceed in the United States, the EC would
only increase transatlantic tensions, just as Commissioner Monti’s term was
to come to a close and just as efforts on best practices in the ICN for merger
control were taking shape. These political factors seem to have been in play
in the EC’s decision to clear Oracle/PeopleSoft. DOJ’s loss in the district
court provided cover for the Europeans not to challenge the deal
aggressively so that Commissioner Monti would not leave a political bomb
177. Edward T. Swaine, “Competition, Not Competitors,” Nor Canards: Ways of
Criticizing the Commission, 23 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 597 (2002).
178. Id.
179. See generally Eleanor M. Fox, GE/Honeywell: The U.S. Merger that Europe
Stopped—A Story of the Politics of Convergence, in ANTITRUST STORIES 331 (Eleanor M.
Fox & Daniel A. Crane eds., 2007); Eleanor M. Fox, Mergers in Global Markets:
GE/Honeywell and the Future of Merger Control, 23 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 457 (2002).
180. Daniel J. Gifford & Robert T. Kudrle, European Union Competition Law and
Policy: How Much Latitude for Convergence with the United States?, 48 ANTITRUST BULL.
727 (2003).
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for his successor Commissioner Kroes and another potential transatlantic
rift.181
Having described past divergence, we now examine the present and
future use of efficiencies in merger law and economics and how there might
be divergence between the United States and Europe. With the political
issues resolved and closer day-to-day coordination between U.S. and E.U.
agencies, the type of political divergence between merger deals may be a
thing of the past. Consequently, we lay out a hypothetical merger based on
purely economic factors that might lead to divergent outcomes.
B. U.S. Efficiencies in Merger Law
Efficiencies in mergers went through a significant transformation over a
period of thirty years between the 1960s and 1990s. In the 1960s,
efficiencies were treated with some hostility under U.S. case law. In In re
Foremost Dairies,182 a violation of section 7 of the Sherman Act would
include a firm’s “over-all organization [that] gives it a decisive advantage in
efficiency over its smaller rivals,”183 while in Philadelphia National
Bank,184 the Supreme Court noted that “a merger the effect of which ‘may
be substantially to lessen competition’ is not saved because, on some
ultimate reckoning of social or economic debits and credits, it may be
deemed beneficial.”185 Technically, the Court has never renounced its
earlier view on mergers efficiencies in its more modern antitrust
jurisprudence, largely because there has not been a substantive merger case
before the Court in over a generation.
Though efficiencies arguments began to emerge as part of the rule of
reason analysis in conduct cases, its adoption in earnest within the area of
mergers came later. Starting in the 1980s, the rewriting of the efficiencies
analysis, as part of the 1984 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, moved
efficiencies from being a defense to part of the competitive effects.186
Certain cases along the way, such as United States v. General Dynamics
Corp.,187 also helped.188

181. Christian Duvernoy & Sven Völcker, Oracle in Brussels, 5 M&A J. 1, 15 (2005),
available
at
http://law.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1022&context=wilmer
(“One theory is that after GE/Honeywell, the Commission was making a political decision
and hiding that fact: ‘Let’s look different and independent, but let’s also come out with the
same result.’”). Commissioner Kroes soon created a number of transatlantic political crises
of her own without the help of Monti.
182. 60 F.T.C. 944 (1962).
183. Id. at 1084.
184. 374 U.S. 321 (1963).
185. Id. at 371.
186. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, MERGER GUIDELINES § 3.5 (1984), reprinted in 4 Trade Reg.
Rep. (CCH) ¶ 13,103.
187. 415 U.S. 486 (1974).
188. William J. Kolasky & Andrew R. Dick, The Merger Guidelines and the Integration
of Efficiencies into Antitrust Review of Horizontal Mergers, 71 ANTITRUST L.J. 207, 209–22
(2003).
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This brief historic overview of merger efficiencies allows us to move to
the present legal regime for merger analysis of efficiencies—the 2010
Merger Guidelines,189 which for the most part adopted the 1997 version of
the efficiencies section.190 What the language of the 2010 Merger
Guidelines suggests at first blush is an unambiguous support of a consumer
welfare standard.
Efficiencies are treated under a “sliding scale” approach.191 The 2010
Merger Guidelines explain:
The Agencies will not challenge a merger if cognizable efficiencies are of
a character and magnitude such that the merger is not likely to be
anticompetitive in any relevant market.
To make the requisite
determination, the Agencies consider whether cognizable efficiencies
likely would be sufficient to reverse the merger’s potential to harm
customers in the relevant market, e.g., by preventing price increases in
that market. In conducting this analysis, the Agencies will not simply
compare the magnitude of the cognizable efficiencies with the magnitude
of the likely harm to competition absent the efficiencies. The greater the
potential adverse competitive effect of a merger, the greater must be the
cognizable efficiencies, and the more they must be passed through to
customers, for the Agencies to conclude that the merger will not have an
anticompetitive effect in the relevant market.192

The 2010 Merger Guidelines add that “[i]n adhering to this approach, the
Agencies are mindful that the antitrust laws give competition, not internal
operational efficiency, primacy in protecting customers.”193 Courts have
responded to this language by adopting a true consumer welfare standard
with regard to efficiencies.194 Indeed, most of the litigated cases before the
courts do not rest strongly on an efficiency argument, but this has not

189. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES
10, at 29–31 (2010) [hereinafter 2010 MERGER GUIDELINES], available at
http://ftc.gov/os/2010/08/100819hmg.pdf.
190. D. Daniel Sokol & James A. Fishkin, Antitrust Merger Efficiencies in the Shadow of
the Law, 64 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 45, 55–56 (2011), http://www.vanderbiltlawreview.org/
content/articles/2011/03/Sokol-Fishkin-Antitrust-Merger-Efficiencies-in-the-Shadow-of-theLaw-64-Vand.-L.-Rev.-En-Banc-45-20114.pdf.
191. Robert Pitofsky, Efficiencies in Defense of Mergers: Two Years After, 7 GEO.
MASON L. REV. 485, 486 (1999) (“[T]he revisions expressly incorporated a sliding-scale
approach into efficiency analysis.”); see also Dep’t of Justice & Fed. Trade Comm’n,
Transcript of Merger Workshop, Day 3, at 12, 21, 100 (Feb. 19, 2004), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/bc/mergerenforce/040219ftctrans.pdf (discussing the sliding-scale
analysis for evaluating efficiency claims).
192. 2010 MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 189, at 30–31. For an economic analysis, see
Roger D. Blair & Jessica S. Haynes, The Efficiencies Defense in the 2010 Horizontal
Guidelines, 39 REV. INDUS. ORG. 57 (2011).
193. 2010 MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 189, at 31.
194. Kolasky & Dick, supra note 188, at 232 (“The courts have largely adopted the
analytical framework for evaluating efficiency claims that is set out in the Guidelines.”); see
also Greene, supra note 49 (describing the adoption of the merger guidelines by courts).
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stopped various courts in dicta from reiterating the importance of consumer
welfare in the efficiencies context.195
However, as the expression goes, the devil is in the details. In our case,
that detail is footnote fifteen of the efficiencies section of the 2010 Merger
Guidelines, which provides for the possibility of the use of a total welfare
standard for merger efficiencies.196 In that footnote, the 2010 Merger
Guidelines explain, “The Agencies also may consider the effects of
cognizable efficiencies with no short-term, direct effect on prices in the
relevant market.”197
This attention to detail also opens up the possibility of some ambiguity
within case law as to what welfare standard might come into play regarding
a case that substantively may be litigated upon efficiency grounds. To date,
there has been only one case in which there was a significant discussion of
efficiencies under the modern Merger Guidelines, a merger known
commonly as the “baby foods case” and officially as FTC v. H.J. Heinz
Co.198 The case involved a proposed three-to-two merger between Heinz
and Beech Nut, the number two and number three firms in the baby food
market.199 The merging parties argued that the merged company would
provide efficiencies to more effectively compete with the market leader,
Gerber.200
According to the D.C. Circuit in Heinz, to prove the case for accepting
the efficiencies argument of the parties, given the high level of
concentration of the merged firm, would require extraordinary efficiencies.
However, the court did not make clear what it meant by extraordinary
efficiencies. From the standpoint of welfare standards, the court was also
silent as to whether extraordinary efficiencies should be measured using
consumer welfare or total welfare (the district court had been similarly
silent as to the standard). Unfortunately, the only guidance as to the welfare
standard for extraordinary efficiencies comes in the form of dicta via a

195. FTC v. Arch Coal, Inc., 329 F. Supp. 2d 109, 153 (D.D.C. 2004) (“The existence of
such efficiencies, therefore, remains relevant to an assessment of the post-merger market and
the potential benefits to consumers from cost reductions and increased competition.”); FTC
v. Cardinal Health, Inc., 12 F. Supp. 2d 34, 62 (D.D.C. 1998) (“[T]he FTC does not contest
that the mergers will result in large-scale efficiencies, some of which will be passed on to the
consumer.”); United States v. Long Island Jewish Med. Ctr., 983 F. Supp. 121, 137
(E.D.N.Y. 1997) (“In sum, to sustain an ‘efficiencies defense,’ the defendants must clearly
demonstrate that the proposed merger itself will create a net economic benefit for the health
care consumer.”); FTC v. Staples, Inc., 970 F. Supp. 1066, 1090 (D.D.C. 1997) (“The Court
has no doubt that a portion of any efficiencies achieved through a merger of the defendants
would be passed on to customers.”).
196. 2010 MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 189, at 31 n.15.
197. Id.
198. 246 F.3d 708 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
199. See id. Efficiencies cases are rare around the world. See OECD, DYNAMIC
EFFICIENCIES IN MERGER ANALYSIS 28 n.26 (2007), available at http://www.ftc.gov/
bc/international/docs/Dynamic%20Efficiencies%20in%20Merger%20Analysis%20%20US.pdf.
200. H.J. Heinz Co., 246 F.3d at 720.
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citation to FTC v. University Health.201 The Heinz D.C. Circuit decision
quoted the proposition in University Health that “a defendant who seeks to
overcome a presumption that a proposed acquisition would substantially
lessen competition must demonstrate that the intended acquisition would
result in significant economies and that these economies ultimately would
benefit competition and, hence, consumers.”202 The problem with this
statement is that it muddled what goal might be reached. It could be that
what might benefit competition (total welfare) may be at odds in some set
of cases with what might benefit consumers (consumer welfare) in the
situation of extraordinary efficiencies.203 One could imagine a hypothetical
two-to-one firm merger in which prices might not fall, but the combined
firm conducts research and development more efficiently.204 Under a total
welfare standard, such a merger should be allowed even though under a
consumer welfare standard the outcome might be more ambiguous. In such
circumstances, prices may go up for a number of years before going down
many years later, if at all.205
C. E.U. Efficiencies in Merger Law
Whereas E.U. competition law was a part of the Treaty of Rome in 1957
with regard to conduct, merger control at the E.U. level came about
relatively late in 1989 with the EC Merger Regulation (ECMR), which went
into effect in 1990.206 An amended ECMR went into effect first in 1998
and then in its current form in 2004.207
201. Id.
202. Id. (quoting FTC v. Univ. Health, 938 F.2d 1206, 1223 (11th Cir. 1991)).
203. The Merger Guidelines suggest that consumers are the net beneficiaries, although
this has not come up in a court context. 2010 MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 189, at 30–31.
204. This hypothetical is based on the Genzyme/Novazyme merger. See Statement of
Chairman Timothy J. Muris in the Matter of Genzyme Corporation/Novazyme
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., FTC, 6–10 (Jan. 13, 2004), http://www.ftc.gov/os/2004/01/
murisgenzymestmt.pdf; Dissenting Statement of Commissioner Mozelle W. Thompson,
Genzyme Corporation’s Acquisition of Novazyme Pharmaceuticals Inc., FTC (Jan. 13,
2004), http://www.ftc.gov/os/2004/01/thompsongenzymestmt.pdf.
205. Gregory Werden et al., The Effects of Merger Efficiencies on Consumers of
Differentiated Products, 1 EURO. COMPETITION J. 245 (2005) (discussing how to
conceptualize potential pass through to consumers). We assume away the problem that it
may be difficult to quantify efficiencies effectively. For this critique, see Frédéric Jenny et
al., Substantive Standards for Mergers and the Role of Efficiencies, in INTERNATIONAL
ANTITRUST LAW & POLICY: ANNUAL PROCEEDINGS OF THE FORDHAM CORPORATE LAW
INSTITUTE 301, 343 (Barry Hawk ed., 2003) (“We can’t solve this. Economists, the system,
auditoriums full of well-educated competition analysts, cannot actually overcome the
essential unpredictability of the future.”). For discussions of dynamic merger efficiencies,
see Michael L. Katz & Howard A. Shelanski, Merger Analysis and the Treatment of
Uncertainty: Should We Expect Better?, 74 ANTITRUST L.J. 537 (2007) and Gary L. Roberts
& Steven C. Salop, Efficiencies in Dynamic Merger Analysis, 19 WORLD COMPETITION 4
(1996).
206. Council Regulation (EC) No. 4064/89 of 21 December 1989, on the Control of
Concentrations Between Undertakings, 1989 O.J. (L 395) 1, 12.
207. Council Regulation (EC) No. 139/2004 of 20 January 2004, on the Control of
Concentrations Between Undertakings, 2004 O.J. (L 24).
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The ECMR explicitly recognizes efficiencies as of the 2004 revisions. It
notes, “In order to determine the impact of a concentration on competition
in the common market, it is appropriate to take account of any substantiated
and likely efficiencies put forward by the undertakings concerned.”208 This
is based upon “the development of technical and economic progress
provided that it is to the consumers’ advantage and does not form an
obstacle to competition.”209 The EC Horizontal Merger Guidelines note
that an efficiencies defense will work in situations where
the Commission is in a position to conclude on the basis of sufficient
evidence that the efficiencies generated by the merger are likely to
enhance the ability and incentive of the merged entity to act procompetitively for the benefits of consumers, thereby counteracting the
adverse effects on competition which the merger might otherwise
have.210

Furthermore, efficiencies must “benefit consumers.”211 As a result of the
language from the ECMR and the Merger Guidelines, it seems to be the
case that the welfare standard for an efficiencies defense in Europe is
consumer welfare.
European merger cases support this view of a consumer welfare standard.
In Inco/Falconbridge,212 the EC rejected an efficiencies defense (although
conditioned approval of the merger-based remedies proposed) because the
efficiencies of the proposed merged firm would not be passed through to
consumers. Similarly, regarding Ryanair/Aer Lingus, the EC rejected an
efficiencies defense in part because it believed that the efficiencies would
not be passed on to consumers.213 In a more recent airlines case,
Lufthansa/SN Airholding, the EC approved a merger but rejected the
efficiencies defense because the efficiencies could not be passed through to
consumers.214
Adding an analytical twist to the European approach is that, unlike the
United States,215 the European Union has relatively recent merger
guidelines that apply in cases of conglomerate effects and vertical
208. Id. ¶ 29, recital 29.
209. Id. art. 2(1)(b).
210. Guidelines on the Assessment of Horizontal Mergers Under the Council Regulation
on the Control of Concentrations Between Undertakings, 2004 O.J. 2004 No. (C 31/5) ¶ 77.
211. Id. ¶ 78.
212. See Case COMP/M.4000, Inco/Falconbridge (July. 4, 2006), http://ec.europa.eu/
competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m4000_20060704_20600_en.pdf.
213. See Case T-342/07, Ryanair Holdings PLC v. Commission, 2010 E.C.R. II-03457.
214. Case No. COMP/M.5335, Lufthansa/SN Airholding, ¶¶ 405–31 (June 22, 2009),
available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m5335_20090622_206
00_en.pdf.
215. DOJ, NON-HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, originally issued as 1984 Merger
Guidelines, 49 Fed. Reg. 26,823 (1984), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/
guidelines/2614.pdf. For commentary, see Deborah L. Feinstein, Are the Vertical Merger
Guidelines Ripe for Revision?, 24 ANTITRUST 5 (2010); James Langenfeld, Non-horizontal
Merger Guidelines in the United States and the European Commission: Time for the United
States To Catch Up?, 16 GEO. MASON L. REV. 851 (2009).
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mergers.216 These European nonhorizontal guidelines make clear that “the
fact that rivals may be harmed because a merger creates efficiencies cannot
in itself give rise to competition concerns.”217 Efficiencies seem to take a
consumer welfare approach under these guidelines as well.218 In the Tom
Tom/Tele Atlas case,219 the EC took a consumer welfare approach to
efficiencies in a detailed discussion of efficiencies, even though the EC
found that the efficiencies were irrelevant to the decision to approve since
the deal did not present anticompetitive concerns.220
D. Economics of Merger Efficiencies
Having discussed divergence in the case law, we move to an economic
analysis of merger efficiencies and illustrate how a change in welfare
standard might lead to divergent outcomes in the United States and the
European Union. Efficiency that flows as a result of a merger may justify
mergers and joint ventures under antitrust law. The Williamsonian tradeoff
of merger specific efficiencies may lead to situations where the merged firm
is able to pass on the merger specific cost savings to consumers. However,
the efficiency tradeoff may result in an increase of monopoly power. In
those circumstances in which the increase in market power still leads to
lower prices, there is no antitrust problem regardless of the welfare standard
used. There will, however, be a problem in those situations in which the
efficiencies enhance total welfare but reduce consumer welfare through
higher prices.
In Figure 3, the premerger price and quantity are represented as P1 and
Q1. What determines P1 and Q1 are the equality of demand (represented as
D) and the competitive supply, which the figures shows as MC1 = AC1. The
model in the figure assumes that the industry’s marginal cost (represented
as MC1) and average cost (represented as AC1) remain constant. The
merger will increase efficiency. We reflect this as the decrease in costs
from MC1 = AC1 to MC2 = AC2. If market power due to the merger does not
increase, the cost savings will be passed on to consumers.221 Postmerger,
the price will fall to P2 and the quantity will rise from Q1 to Q2. Under this
scenario, the merger should not raise competition law concerns since the
216. Guidelines in the Assessment of Non-horizontal Mergers, 2008 O.J. (C 265/6).
217. Id. ¶ 16.
218. Id. ¶ 31 (“As indicated above, for input foreclosure to lead to consumer harm, it is
not necessary that the merged firm’s rivals are forced to exit the market. The relevant
benchmark is whether the increased input costs would lead to higher prices for consumers.
Any efficiencies resulting from the mergermay [sic], however, lead the merged entity to
reduce price, so that the overall likely impact on consumers is neutral or positive.”).
219. See Case No. COMP/M.4854, TomTom/Tele Atlas (May 14, 2008), http://ec.europa
.eu/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m4854_20080514_20682_en.pdf
(declaring
a
concentration to be compatible with the common market and the EEA Agreement).
220. Id. ¶ 250.
221. Due to the perfectly elastic competitive supply curve, all of the cost saving is passed
on to consumers when the market remains competitive. If the supply were positively sloped,
not all of the cost saving would be passed on, but output would still rise and price would still
fall.
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welfare effects are positive—both consumer welfare and total welfare
increase.222
Figure 3: Mergers Specific Efficiencies: the Welfare Tradeoffs

Under an alternative scenario, there is a merger in which market power
increases as a result of an efficiency-enhancing merger. In Figure 3, let us
assume that the merger leads to the same cost savings as before. However,
unlike before, the exercise of the market power that results from the merger
leads to an increase in price from P1 to P3. This leads to a corresponding
decrease in quantity from Q1 to Q3. From a consumer welfare framework,
the merger is undesirable. The consumer has experienced an increase in the
price paid. Moreover, the consumer also does not appear to benefit from
the cost reduction that has occurred as a result of the merger. Figure 3
measures this as the allocative inefficiency resulting from market power
postmerger that causes consumer welfare to fall from area acP1 to area
abP3. If the lawfulness of the merger under the legal regime is determined
solely on the basis of consumer welfare, the result is that in this market, the
merger would be unlawful.
Examining the same scenario but from the lens of total welfare, the
lawfulness of the merger may be different. Two issues arise in this context.
222. For a similar result, see MOTTA, supra note 6, at 261–62.
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First, whether total welfare rises or falls depends on the relative magnitudes
of the allocative inefficiency and the cost saving. In Figure 3, we represent
the allocative inefficiency by the triangular area bcd. The postmerger profit
to the sellers is equal to the rectangle P3beP2. Part of this, area P3bdP1, is a
transfer from consumers to producers, while rectangle P1deP2 represents the
cost saving. Given how Figure 3 has been drawn, the cost saving as a result
of the merger appears to be larger than the allocative inefficiency from the
merger. When this is the result of a merger, the merger should be lawful
under a system that follows a total welfare standard because the benefits of
the cost saving outweigh the allocative inefficiency. Indeed, from a KaldorHicks cost-benefit analysis, under this scenario the merger is efficient
because the winners of the merger (the producers) would be able to
compensate the losers of the merger (the consumers) and still be better
off.223
This possible outcome is not the only one that could arise after the
merger. There may be circumstances in which the allocative inefficiency
will outweigh the postmerger cost saving. Under such circumstances, the
merger will reduce both consumer welfare and total welfare. As a result,
the joint venture will be inefficient on the Kaldor-Hicks criterion because it
will not be possible for the winners of the merger (producers) to profitably
compensate the losers of the merger (consumers). Under both a total
welfare and consumer welfare standard the merger should be unlawful and
forbidden.
Even if the welfare standard is exclusively consumer welfare, it is
important to note that the cost savings of the merger described above
benefit consumers generally. It is the case that these cost savings will
improve the sellers’ profits in this market. However, an inference that
would dismiss these cost savings as inconsequential to consumers would be
mistaken.224 The costs of production that sellers face decrease as fewer of
society’s scarce resources are needed to produce the output being sold.225
Consequently, these resources are available to be redeployed to produce
goods and services in other markets. Even though the consumer benefits
that flow from these cost savings may be diffused throughout the economy,
they still exist.226
This economic analysis shows that it is possible for a merger to be
allowed under a total welfare standard but blocked under a consumer
welfare standard. If this merger is efficiency enhancing both domestically
223. See RICHARD JUST ET AL., APPLIED WELFARE ECONOMICS AND PUBLIC POLICY 32–38
(1982) (discussing Kaldor-Hicks efficiency); THOMAS J. MICELI, THE ECONOMIC APPROACH
TO LAW 5–7 (2d ed. 2009) (same).
224. We are not counting the cost savings twice. One may dismiss them as beneficial to
the sellers, but they should be considered for their benefits to consumers.
225. We are not referring to the resources not being used because output has been reduced
from Q1 to Q3. We are instead referring to the resources now needed to produce Q3.
226. Paul A. Pautler, The Effects of Mergers and Post-merger Integration: A Review of
Business Consulting Literature (Jan. 21, 2003) (unpublished manuscript), available at
www.ftc.gov/be/rt/businesreviewpaper.pdf (surveying the literature on efficiencies).
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and globally, it could still be blocked in Europe but not in the United States,
given existing case law. Thus, a merger that enhances total welfare globally
may not go through (even if it is total welfare enhancing in each
jurisdiction) because the welfare standards of the two antitrust powers differ
with regard to merger efficiencies.
CONCLUSION
Divergence across goals of antitrust impact both antitrust law and policy.
In the United States, goals of antitrust are exclusively economic ones. In
Europe, there are some political noneconomic goals in addition to economic
goals. Over time, E.U. case law and policy will recognize that the only
goals that will impact antitrust are economic ones. This seems to be the
trend within DG Competition, although the courts and legal academics have
not yet followed this trend as strongly. However, the transition to
exclusively economic goals across jurisdictions is not without peril.
Welfare standards as between total welfare and consumer welfare are not
always clear. Moreover, the choice of welfare standards might lead to
divergent outcomes both within a single antitrust system and across
antitrust systems. We demonstrate how such divergence plays out in the
examples of RPM and merger efficiencies.
In a best-case worldwide scenario, we believe that total welfare should
guide antitrust. However, when given the choice between political factors
playing a role in antitrust analysis versus a standard of consumer welfare,
we choose consumer welfare as a second best standard to bring economic
clarity to the law and policy of antitrust globally.

